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Restoring the Presumption of Innocence
SHiMA BARADARAN*
The most commonly repeated adage in U.S. criminal justice is the presumption
of innocence: defendants are deemed innocent until proven guilty. Historically,
this presumption carried important meaning both before and during trial.
However, in light of state and federal changes in pretrial practice, as well as
Supreme Court precedent restricting the presumption's application to trial, the
presumption of innocence no longer protects defendants before trial. These
limitations on the presumption are fundamentally inconsistent with its
constitutional roots. The results of the presumption's diminution are also
troubling as the number of defendants held pretrial has steadily increased such
that the majority of people in our nation's jails have not been convicted of any
crime. Few contemporary legal scholars have focused on the dwindling
pretrial presumption, let alone its constitutional implications. This Article fills
the void by examining, historically, how the Due Process Clause provides the
constitutional basis for the presumption of innocence and how that
presumption secures at least one pretrial right: the right to release on bail,
absent serious flight risk. This Article introduces three principles to ensure
that the pretrial presumption of innocence remains true to its constitutional
roots. Returning the presumption to its constitutional foundation and ensuring
its application in ways that are consistent with that foundation will result in
less confusion in the courts and a more consistent approach to pretrial
decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The presumption of innocence is one of the most familiar maxims in
criminal law.' Historically, the presumption protected defendants from the time
of charge to trial.2 Grounded in the Due Process Clause, the presumption
prohibited judges from predicting whether defendants were guilty. Preventing
judges from deciding defendants' guilt pretrial ensured that defendants would
remain at liberty before trial. At trial, the presumption solely applied to require
prosecutors to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3
Despite the historical import of the presumption of innocence, changes in
federal and state statutes have increased the opportunity for judges to predict
I Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); see also 1 CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS
§ 22.2.3, at 325 (Theodorus Mommsen et al. eds., 16th ed. 1954) [hereinafter CORPuS] ("The
burden of proof rests on who asserts, not on who denies."); James Bradley Thayer, The
Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases, 6 YALE L.J. 185, 188-89 (1897).
2 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *300 ("Upon
the whole, if the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is to be committed
to the county gaol by the mittimus of the justice ... ; there to abide till delivered by due
course of law. But this imprisonment, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for
punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner
ought to be used with the utmost humanity: and neither be loaded with needless fetters, or
subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose of
confinement only[.]" (citations omitted)); 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2511, at 504 (2d ed. 1923) (the presumption of innocence "hovers over the
prisoner as a guardian angel" from the moment of indictment until the verdict is
determined); see, e.g., People v. Riley, 33 N.E.2d 872, 875 (I11. 1941) ("Any person indicted
stands before the bar of justice clothed with a presumption of innocence and, as such, is
tenderly regarded by the law. Every safeguard is thrown about him. The requirements of
proof are many, and all moral, together with many technical, rules stand between him and
any possible punishment.").3 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970).
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guilt before trial. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has said that the presumption
of innocence solely requires the prosecutor to show proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.4 The result is that the presumption of innocence now applies only at trial.
The practical results of the presumption's diminution are apparent and
troubling. 5 The number of defendants held pretrial has steadily increased such
that the majority of people in our nation's jails have not been convicted of any
crime. 6 In the last fourteen years, the United States has gone from releasing
62% of defendants to only 40%,7 without much complaint, discussion, or even
acknowledgement by legal scholars. 8
While several legal scholars commented on bail and detention during the
1970s and 1980s,9 few contemporary legal scholars have analyzed the results of
the changes in pretrial release standards and loss of the presumption of
innocence.10 And while some scholars have grieved the loss of the presumption
4 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 582 n.11 (1979).
5 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160 (1968).6 of the individuals in local jails, 62% have not been convicted of a crime and are
being detained pretrial. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007, at 5 (2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/jim07.pdf.
7See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf (describing federal release statistics as an example).
8 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DETENTION NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND BASELINE
REPORT: A COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL DETENTION STATISTICS 3-4 (2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/compendium final.pdf.
9See Sam J. Erwin, Jr., Foreword: Preventative Detention-A Step Backward for
Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291 (1971); John Goldkamp, Danger and
Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-2
(1985); Gerald H. Goldstein, Pretrial Imprisonment, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1169, 1170-71 (1976);
Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of
Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 441, 442 (arguing that a probable guilt model
should apply pretrial rather than probable cause); Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of
Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970). For
a recent discussion of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the Excessive Bail Clause, see
Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of
the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
121, 122-23 (2009).
10 But see William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 329, 404
(1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's connection of the presumption of innocence to the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) and
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978)); Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared
Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (stating
that the presumption of innocence is a "fundamental principle of due process" and that it
should not be relevant to predicting the final outcome of a trial); Louis M. Natali, Jr. &
Edward D. Ohlbaum, Redrafting the Due Process Model: The Preventive Detention
Blueprint, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 1225, 1235-36 (1989) (discussing the evolving scope and
purpose of the presumption of innocence); Chalmous G. Reemes, Note, United States v.
Salerno: The Validation of Preventative Detention and the Denial of a Presumed
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of innocence, no articles have both analyzed the effects of this loss and
explained without reliance on normative arguments why we should reclaim it.11
This Article attempts to contribute to this scholarship by examining how the
Due Process Clause is the constitutional basis for the presumption of innocence
and how that presumption secures the right against pretrial detention, absent
serious flight risk. 12 After conducting a historical analysis of the Due Process
Clause and the presumption of innocence, this Article provides some thoughts
on how the original meaning of the presumption of innocence should apply in
the modem world. This Article puts forth three principles by which the
presumption of innocence and due process can apply consistently, while
precluding improper judicial predictions of guilt.
This Article proceeds in four stages. Part II of this Article traces the history
of the presumption of innocence and its constitutional basis, beginning at
ancient texts and continuing through to the common law and finally U.S. cases,
with a focus on pretrial rights and bail. This section also traces the common law
history of the Due Process Clause and the presumption of innocence and
demonstrates that pretrial liberty was preserved because bail was presumed for
noncapital cases. Bail determinations served the purpose of ensuring that the
defendant appeared at trial, not preventing additional crimes from being
committed. And there were no decisions about guilt before trial as legal guilt
was properly determined at trial. Part III also analyzes the history of the
changes to bail in federal and state courts, from the 1960s to 1980s, which
removed the presumption of bail in most cases, led to pretrial weighing of
evidence and expanded the number of legitimate reasons to detain the accused.
Part IV discusses the changes in interpretation of the Due Process Clause and
the impacts of these changes on the pretrial presumption of innocence by
considering the state murder exception in bail cases as an example. Part V
introduces, for the first time, three constitutionally rooted principles to guide the
application of the presumption of innocence pretrial. Because there has been a
lack of consistent principles to apply the presumption of innocence, it has
Constitutional Right to Bail, 41 ARK. L. REv. 697, 701 (1988) (noting briefly that the Due
Process Clause and the presumption of innocence are linked in that they both require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to deprive someone of her individual liberty).
11 Compare Frangois Quintard-Mordnas, The Presumption of Innocence in the French
and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. CoMP. L. 107, 126 (2010), with Patrick G.
Jackson, The Impact of Pretrial Preventive Detention, 12 JUST. SYs. J. 305, 332 (1987). But
see Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781, 782-83 (2011) (arguing that preventive
detention does not necessarily require indefinite detention or denial of the right to notice
upon arrest nor the possibility of incarceration for a significant amount of time without due
process).
12Te other constitutional basis is the Sixth Amendment. The historical development
of the Sixth Amendment and its ties to the presumption of innocence will be discussed in a
follow-up article. For an interesting argument that the Equal Protection Clause should be the
basis for criminal rights since due process has run its course, see Jeremy M. Miller, The
Potential for an Equal Protection Revolution, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 287, 289 (2006).
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diminished in meaning and been inconsistently applied by courts. This section
discusses three principles with which to apply the presumption of innocence
pretrial. First, pretrial restraints of liberty should be limited to where there is a
proper basis. The proper basis for restricting a person's liberty includes
ensuring a person's attendance at trial, protecting the judicial process from
interference by defendant, and if defendant is detained, protecting the security
of the facility. Second, the pretrial focus should not be on guilt-determination
and punishment as the Due Process Clause requires a conviction of guilt by a
jury in order to punish an individual. Third, the focus of pretrial protections for
defendants should not be on obtaining the truth of a person's guilt or innocence,
but should protect defendants' liberty until innocence or guilt can be proven at
trial. Respecting these rights will honor the original influence of the Due
Process Clause on bail rights-tempered by modem realities-and has the
potential of creating a disciplined change in focus in pretrial practice.
II. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
In the early days of common law development, imprisonment was scarcely
judicial and was often used arbitrarily by the English monarchs. 13 However,
"[o]ne of the most celebrated clauses of [the] Magna Carta was that which
guaranteed the king's subject immunity from imprisonment, or other
punishment, save through the due process of the law."'14 In the centuries
following the Magna Carta, due process and the presumption of innocence
gained substance at common law; and, subsequent abuses by the monarch
eventually led Parliament to take action to reinforce these common law
principles. 15 These common law principles crossed the Atlantic with the
colonists. 16 Historically, in the United States, the presumption of innocence and
due process required a legal determination at trial to punish a defendant for a
crime. 7 Due process demanded that a person maintain liberty and not be
13 ROBERT BARTLETr, ENGLAND UNDER THE NORMAN AND ANGEVIN KINGS: 1075-
1225, at 186 (2000). For example, Henry kept his brother Robert and the rebel, Robert de
Belleme, in captivity until their death "out of prudence rather than after judgment." Id.
14ALAN LLOYD, KING JOHN 302 (1973).
15 Early in the seventeenth century, Parliament engaged in heated debate about the
"fundamental laws and liberties of the Kingdom" when Charles I arbitrarily imprisoned five
of his knights. See Sarah Willms, The Five Knights' Case and Debates in the Parliament of
1628: Division and Suspicion Under King Charles 1, 7 CONSTRUCTING THE PAST 92, 93
(2006), available at http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1082&
context=-constructing. Parliament eventually passed the Habeus Corpus Act of 1679;
however, "[i]t should be noticed that the law did not grant anything new; that it did not make
habeas corpus, but merely made efficient a writ, which was recognized as already existing."
A.H. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. HIST. REv. 18, 19 (1902).16 Carpenter, supra note 15, at 18-19.
17 Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W. 359, 361 (Ky. 1903) (holding that punishment
without evidence of guilt should not occur and in this case the court should have instructed
the jury to find the defendant not guilty). The concept of the presumption of innocence is not
2011]
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imprisoned or punished without appropriate legal action. 18 In addition, the
presumption of innocence, a fundamental principle of American criminal law,
presumed bail for all noncapital cases. 19 Also, since the primary purpose of bail
was to ensure a defendant's presence at trial, the presumption of innocence did
not allow judges to detain defendants because they were likely to commit a
crime while released, or to weigh the evidence against defendants before trial,
in deciding whether they should be released.
A. Bail Was Presumed for Noncapital Cases and Guilt Was Not
Determined Pretrial
Historically, the presumption of innocence and the due process principles
included a presumption of bail for noncapital cases and guaranteed that guilt
would not be determined before trial. The presumption of innocence came into
effect when a defendant was arrested and charged. One of the most significant
protections that accompanied the presumption of innocence was the
constitutional right to pretrial release through bail. 20 While there was some
discretion and bail was not always allowed for every alleged crime, it was
a modem development, and is common to many ancient legal systems. See Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895) (tracing the presumption of innocence from Deuteronomy
and ancient Greek and Roman law). The U.S. legal tradition traces its reliance on the
presumption of innocence to the English common law. See Caleb Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 965-66 (1965) (recognizing that the
importance of avoiding prison pretrial was central to the famous Magna Carta promise that
"'no freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison ... unless.., by the law of the land."'
(quoting 1 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 251
(1963))).
18See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but
there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or
property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case."); see also CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW
CONCEPTS 104 (1930) ("It is commonly conceded that the purpose of the phrase 'by the law
of the land,' which was later transformed into the more popular form 'due process of law,'
was intended primarily to insist upon rules of procedure in the administration of criminal
justice, namely, that judgment must precede execution, that a judgment must be delivered by
the accused man's 'equals,' and that no free man could be punished except in accordance
with the law of England .... ").
19 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453-54. The overarching rationale for this presumption is based
on the widely held belief "[tihat it is better a hundred guilty persons should escape than one
innocent person should suffer." See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
173, 175 (1997) (quoting Benjamin Franklin and detailing the many formulations of this
principle in the American legal tradition).
20 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (explaining that a defendant is entitled to
pretrial release until proven guilty as the spirit of bail is to "enable the[] [defendant] to stay
out of jail until a trial has found them guilty"); see also Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1156
(1981) ("The protection against excessive bail has a direct nexus to the presumption of
innocence, implicitly recognized within the [Flourteenth [A]mendment.").
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generally presumed for all accused due largely to the presumption of
innocence. 21 English bail law presumed that defendants would be released and
discussed the "bail decision" as though it were a decision of how to release the
defendant, not if he would be released. To deny bail to a person who is later
determined to be innocent was thought to be far worse than the smaller risk
posed to the public by releasing the accused.22 Some ancient English law
banned pretrial detention in all criminal cases, even murder, due to the
presumption of innocence. 23 However, by 1275 and for the next 500 years, there
was an exception in bail law prohibiting bail in murder cases, 24 though those
accused of murder were often released anyway.25
In the first federal statement on bail, the Judiciary Act guaranteed bail for
all noncapital offenses. The 1789 Judiciary Act held that all noncapital crimes
should be bailable, though capital crimes were bailable at the discretion of the
judge who "exercise[d] their discretion therein, regarding the nature and
circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law."26
21 State v. Mairs, 1 N.J.L. 335, 336 (1795) (explaining that "before trial ... prisoners
are to be presumed innocent of the crime laid to their charge, [and] ... the court ought to
admit them to bail"); see Shore v. State, 6 Mo. 640, 641 (1840) ("By the Constitution of this
State, every offense is bailable, except capital offenses where the proof is evident or the
presumption great."); Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (holding that bail is
only proper where it stands indifferent whether the party be guilty or innocent of the
accusation against him, as it often does before his trial and in this country "a prisoner
is, primafacie, entitled to bail"); see also Dickinson v, Kingsbury, 2 Day 1, 11 (Conn. 1805)
("The personal liberty of the subject is to be favored, as far as is practicable and safe, until
conviction. Bail for his appearance at the Court, in which his guilt or innocence is to be tried,
is, at once, the mode of favoring that liberty, and securing the appearance for trial."); State v.
Connor, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 34, 35 (1796) (decision relying on the pretrial presumption of
innocence).
2 2 THOMAS WONTNER, OLD BAILEY EXPERIENCE: CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
ACTUAL WORKING OF OUR PENAL CODE OF LAwS 263 (London, James Fraser 1833).
23 Id.
24 Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15 (Eng.); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2,
at *298 ("By the ancient common law, before and since the conquest, all felonies were
bailable, till murder was excepted by statute ...."); ELSA DE HAAS, ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL:
ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES TO THE YEAR 1275, at 59 (1940)
(explaining that bail was not extended to homicide cases); see also 1 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 234 (London, MacMillan & Co.
1883) (noting that the Statute of Westminster constituted the law on bail for 550 years in
England).25 4 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 527 (1924).
26 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. Though I do not challenge the
constitutionality of the Judiciary Act, since it simply implemented the English common law
approach to bail, one originalist argument that may be posed is that the Judiciary Act was
passed by the First Congress, of which many members were involved in the Constitution's
drafting and passage, suggesting that this approach is constitutional. However, the response
to this would be Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), which overturned
a part of the Judiciary Act. Additionally, the Judiciary Act arguably opened the way for
evaluating the circumstances of the offense charged and the weight of the evidence against
2011]
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In the early nineteenth century, U.S. state and federal courts unanimously
agreed that the Constitution entitled the accused to pretrial release except when
the crime charged was a capital offense. 27 During the nineteenth century, there
was also discussion of how denying bail violated the presumption of innocence.
Bail was presumed in most cases. 28 In capital cases, courts reserved discretion
to determine whether the accused should receive bail.29 The rationale was that
in capital cases the death penalty may be imposed and a defendant would have a
serious incentive to flee before trial. For instance, a London treatise stated that a
defendant could not be held without bail since "every man shall be presumed
innocent of an offence till he be found guilty. ' 30 And in some criminal actions
the defendant in making discretionary bail decisions, at least with capital offenses. As
discussed in the second part of this section, early state case law takes a similar approach to
that of the Judiciary Act.
27 Note though that during this time a larger number of felonies were considered capital
offenses. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 305 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.,
2002) (noting that many common law felonies were capital offenses but defendant could
avoid the death penalty by pleading "benefit of clergy").28 Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) ("The statutes of the United States have
been framed upon the theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been
finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo
imprisonment or punishment, but may be admitted to bail, not only after arrest and before
trial, but after conviction and pending a writ of error."); United States v. Barber, 140 U.S.
164, 167 (1891) ("But in criminal cases it is for the interest of the public as well as the
accused that the latter should not be detained in custody prior to his trial .... Presumptively
they are innocent of the crime charged, and entitled to their constitutional privilege of being
admitted to bail.... ."); People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539, 542 (1862) ("In all other cases,
[except for capital cases] the admission to bail is a right which the accused can claim, and
which no Judge or Court can properly refuse."); People v. Van Home, 8 Barb. 158, 167
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1850) ("Until his guilt is legally ascertained, there is no ground for
punishment, and it would be cruel and unjust to inflict it." (citation omitted)).29 See Hight v. United States, 1 Morris 407, 409 (Iowa 1845) ("The ordinance of
1787 ... declares that 'all persons[] [sh]all be bailable, unless for capital offenses where the
proof shall be evident or the presumption great.' . . . This is no new provision, but is in
express terms incorporated into the constitutions of at least one-half of the States of the
Union, and is the rule of action in all the rest."); see also Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1, 10, 24-
25 (1870) ("But in the United States the accused has a constitutional right to bail in all
'except in capital cases' .. . Under the [B]ill of [R]ights, bail before conviction is a matter of
right (and not of discretion) for all offenses, except those that are capital.... ." (emphasis
added)); Ex parte Bryant, 34 Ala. 270, 271 (1859) (holding that bail is a right for all
noncapital cases and stating that if the defendant rebuts the evidence of the indictment in a
noncapital case he can be bailed); Exparte Wray, 30 Miss. 673, 674 (1856) ("The provision
of the constitution is as follows: 'That all prisoners shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient securities, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the
presumption great."'); State v. Summons, 19 Ohio 139, 140 (1850) ("The constitution of
Ohio, in article 8, section 12, provides, 'That all persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties unless for capital offenses, where the proof is evident, or the presumption great."').
3 0 JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE GAME LAWS, AND ON FISHERIES 188 (London,
W. Clarke & Sons 1812).
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the defendant was not required to post bail due to the presumption of
innocence. 31 In noncapital cases, bail was generally presumed for the accused.
Courts were generally not allowed to weigh evidence against a defendant,
except in capital cases. Courts emphasized that guilt must be determined at trial,
not before trial, because of the Due Process Clause and presumption of
innocence. 32 And part and parcel of requiring a conviction at trial was a court's
duty to make sure that it did not determine guilt until trial. 33 When bail was
required, it often depended on defendant's financial circumstances, not a
determination of guilt against him.34 Further, accused persons maintained
innocence until proven guilty with evidence at trial, so judges did not weigh
evidence against defendants in determining bail.35
However, in 1944, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 provided that
courts may take into account several factors in setting a bail amount to ensure
the defendant's appearance at trial, including "the weight of the evidence
against him."36 Since Rule 46 restricted the consideration of these factors to
their relevance regarding whether defendant would appear in court, this
provision did not change the inquiry from that done previously under the
Judiciary Act. Though, allowing courts to consider how much evidence exists
against the defendant in all cases (beyond the Judiciary Act that allowed this
consideration only for capital cases) opened the way for later, more expansive
determinations of defendant's guilt before a jury trial. Historically, however, the
presumption of innocence was rooted in the Due Process Clause, requiring
release on bail for defendants charged with noncapital crimes and requiring that
a determination of guilt not occur until trial.
B. Purpose of Bail Was Return to Court, Not Preventing Additional
Crimes
Bail historically served the sole purpose of returning the defendant to court
for trial, not preventing her from committing additional crimes. 37 Indeed,
31 FRANCIS J. TROUBAT & WILLIAM W. HALY, NOTES ON PRACTICE 42 (Philadelphia,
Robert Desilver 1825).
32 See supra notes 19-20.
33 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("[D]ue process of law require[s] charges
and a reasonable opportunity to defend or explain."). Indeed, courts in the 1940s and 1950s
expressed willingness to take the risk that some guilty would escape, in order to avoid
convicting the innocent. See Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1956).
3 4 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 311 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1868).35 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895).
36 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1951) (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P.
46(c) (1946)).
37 See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) (holding that the only reason for bail
is to ensure that the defendant appear for trial); Barret v. Lewis, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 189, 192 (La.
1810) ("Bail is required in this territory for the purpose of securing the plaintiff from the
2011]
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English judges set bail with only one purpose: to ensure the defendant's
appearance in court.38 Early state courts very rarely weighed the evidence
against the defendant openly pretrial, mentioned concerns for safety of the
community, or considered dangerousness of the defendant-even to dismiss
them as improper justifications for denying bail. 39
flight of the defendant and for no other purpose. It is the same in England."); see also Hunt
v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1163 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The federal courts have traditionally
held... [that] the only relevant factor is the likelihood that the defendant will appear for
trial."); Ex parte Verden, 237 S.W. 734, 737 (Mo. 1922) ("Confinement in jail prior to trial
is not authorized because defendant may eventually be convicted of the charge by a jury, or
as any part of his punishment, if guilty, but to assure his presence when the case is called for
trial and during the progress thereof. The only theory on which bail can be denied in any
capital case is that the proof is so strong as to indicate the probability that defendant will flee
if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of a jury." (emphasis added)); People v.
Van Home, 8 Barb. 158, 167 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1850) ("For as I have already stated, the
object of imprisonment before trial is not the punishment of the delinquent, but merely to
secure his appearance in court when his trial is to be had."); Hampton v. State, 42 Ohio St.
401, 404 (1884) ("The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the one arrested when his
personal presence is needed; and, consistently with this, to allow to the accused proper
freedom and opportunity to prepare his defense. The punishment should be after the
sentence.").
38CCHARLES W. BACON ET AL., THE AMERICAN PLAN OF GOVERNMENT 282 (1916)
("Magistrates now fix bail with the one idea of making sure of the prisoner's appearance in
court when wanted."); see 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 299
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1968) (1872). Under
the original purpose of bail, someone charged with a more serious crime who had no money,
ties outside of the jurisdiction, or even a passport would likely receive bail, while a person
who had cash and no community ties, but was charged with a lesser crime, may not be
granted a lower bail amount. See, e.g., Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 42 (S.D. Fla.
1970).
39 Some courts considered additional factors for "flight risk" that went beyond what
was traditionally allowed, including the nature of the crime and weight of evidence against
the defendant. A 1912 California court noted that "[t]here might be instances under this
statute where, for the safety of the individual or of society, it would be proper to deny bail."
In re Henley, 121 P. 933, 935 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912). And in 1930, a New York court
considered the nature of the offense and weight of evidence against the defendant in
determining bail. People ex rel. Rothensies v. Searles, 243 N.Y.S. 15, 17 (App. Div. 1930)
(denying reduction of bail where no proof was offered to show why bail was excessive); see
People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Warden, 233 N.E.2d 265, 269 (N.Y. 1967) (affirming $1000 bail
in part because the defendant was accused of a "vicious crime"); People ex rel. Lobell v.
McDonnell, 71 N.E.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. 1947). Indeed, the Rothensies dissent objected to this
analysis, pointing out that "rumor" of a prior conviction is not a basis for a judicial decision
setting bail at an excessively high amount. Rothensies, 243 N.Y.S. at 19 (Hasbrouck, J.,
dissenting). Dissenting, Justice Hasbrouck connected the denial of bail with due process,
stating that setting a high bail based on a "foundation of [a] rumor certainly is to deprive a
person accused of crime of his liberty without due process of law." Id. The dissent tied a
denial of bail to the oppressive acts of English kings and stated that denial of bail is "not an
act of justice, it is an act of oppression" which is forbidden. Id. (citing 1 W. & M., c. 2
(1689) (Eng.) (English Bill of Rights of 1688); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; N.Y. CONST. art. 1,
§ 5).
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Before releasing a defendant, the defendant had to find a surety. The surety
was a family member or friend that would ensure the defendant would appear at
trial or pay a fine. Because the defendant, presumably, would not want to
punish his sureties he would not flee, and because the sureties would not want
to pay a fine, they would make sure the defendant appeared in court.40 Sureties
would lose their financial deposit only if the defendant did not appear for trial,
not if the defendant committed an additional crime. The focus of a surety was
only to return the defendant to court, not prevent him from committing further
crimes. Bail was not denied based on justifications of public safety or
dangerousness posed by these defendants, and was solely denied when the court
was not assured that defendant would appear at trial.41
Under U.S. law, the purpose of bail was to ensure the appearance of
defendant to "submit to a trial, and the judgment of the court" and not for
preventing future crimes.42 In Stack v. Boyle, the Court demonstrated that it was
serious that bail was only to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial, and not
to prevent her from committing crimes.43 Four defendants were charged with
federal violations as a result of alleged Communist activities.44 The defendants'
bail was set extremely high, and the government, without introducing any
specific evidence, sought to have that bail upheld on the grounds of the offenses
charged. 45 The Court rejected the government's contentions, stating that bail
should not be set unusually high based solely on the indictment.46 Furthermore,
the Court pointed to the long history of admitting bail for noncapital crimes and,
tying these rights to due process and the presumption of innocence, noted that
denying a defendant bail hurts his "traditional right to freedom before
conviction" in addition to the "presumption of innocence." 47 Accordingly, "the
4 0 See Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15 (stating that defendants should be
bailed "without giving ought of their Goods").
412 YEAR BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD THE FIRST: YEARS XXI and XXII, at
56-57 (Alfred J. Horwood ed. & trans., London, Longman & Co. 1873) [hereinafter KING
EDWARD] (citing a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of 1293); Quintard-Mor~nas,
supra note 11, at 126 n.176.42 Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371-72 (1872) (observing that people
released on bail were required to come back to court to ensure a fair trial); Exparte Milburn,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (Bail "is not designed as satisfaction for the offen[s]e, when
it is forfeited and paid, but as a means of compelling the party to submit to the trial and
punishment, which the law ordains for his offen[s]e."); United States v. St. Clair, 42 F.2d 26,
28 (8th Cir. 1930) ("Bail is to procure release of a prisoner by securing his future
attendance.").43 342 U.S. 1, 9 (195 1).
44d at 3.45 1d. at 3.
4 61d. at 6.
47 Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
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fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards
relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. '48
Faced with the threat of Communism, lower federal courts faithfully
applied the Stack rule requiring that the accused not be detained to prevent them
from committing crimes. In a case dealing with Communist Party leaders who
were convicted of "conspiring to advocate and teach the violent overthrow of
the United States," a Second Circuit judge was reluctant to detain them based
on a prediction-even on appeal.49 The judge rejected the idea that a person
would be put in prison to protect society from "predicted but unconsummated
offenses."50
Overall, the purpose of bail historically was to release people before trial.
And the Court in Stack made it very clear that people should not be denied bail
to prevent them from committing additional crimes.
C. Accused Individuals Were Not Incarcerated or Punished
Historically, defendants were punished only when convicted, according to
principles of due process and the presumption of innocence. 51 And the
presumption of innocence protected individuals from imprisonment unless there
was confession in open court or proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.52
Under the common law, the presumption of innocence prevented a felony from
48 d. at 5. Stack thus restricted the exercise of bail authority to the standards of Rule
46.
49 Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 280 (2d Cir. 1950).
50 d. at 282. Though, Carlson v. Landon, decided the same term as Stack, took a
markedly different approach to the presumption of innocence. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952). Carlson also involved alleged Communists, but the Carlson defendants were
resident aliens as well. Id. at 526. The defendants wanted to be released on bail pending
deportation hearings. Id. at 527. The Court emphasized that bail was not guaranteed in all
cases, id. at 545-46, justifying its decision on the basis that "[d]eportation is not a criminal
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment." Id. at 537. Though Carlson was a
deportation case, and thus potentially an exception to normal bail rules, it is the first case
where the court introduced the idea that denial of bail might be justified if it could be shown
to have been done for nonpunitive purposes. Id. at 557 (Black, J., dissenting). Four justices
dissented, claiming that the majority was really detaining these individuals on the basis of
dangerousness and because they were allegedly Communists. Id. at 551. Thus, where Stack
prevented the consideration of a defendant's dangerousness or digging into details of his
crime for purposes of bail determinations, Carlson appeared at least to condone it.
51See Quintard-Mor~nas, supra note 11, at 112 n.35; see also JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EvIDENCE AT THE COMMON Law 552 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1898).
52 COOLEY, supra note 34, at 311; see also People v. Van Home, 8 Barb. 158, 167
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1850) ("If it could be ascertained to a moral certainty that the accused
would appear and stand his trial, there would be no valid objection to admitting him to bail.
For as I have already stated, the object of imprisonment before trial is not the punishment of
the delinquent, but merely to secure his appearance in court when his trial is to be had.").
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attaching until a defendant was convicted. 53 As long as it was certain that the
defendant would appear in court for her trial, she was entitled to avoid any
punishment until the judgment of the court.54 There was even a disincentive to
bring false charges, and a series of statutes enacted to interpret the Magna Carta
included a provision that if false arrests were made, the accuser would be
punished in the same way as the accused would have been.55
The maxim that a defendant was not punished before trial had significant
meaning historically. For instance, a defendant was not prohibited from
Communion after he was accused but before conviction,56 and a priest accused
of adultery continued with his duties. 57 Accused officials retained their rank
until convicted, 58 showing how the presumption of innocence shielded the
accused from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt.59 This maxim
sometimes went as far as not allowing arrests to be made in public, because this
would be a type of punishment before trial.60 Likewise in England, comments in
the media about a person's guilt were criticized when the individual had not yet
been found guilty.61
Early on, the Supreme Court clearly stated that no imprisonment or
punishment is allowed until trial.62 In the 1930s, the Court established that
guilty defendants "until convicted" were presumed innocent.63 In the 1950s and
1960s, the Court continued to uphold due process rights, insisting that there
should not be any imprisonment until after a finding of guilt.64 Due process
rights guaranteed that a defendant should not lose liberty until the government
produced evidence to convince the factfinder of her guilt.65 The Court explicitly
53 Liberty of Subject, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 1 (Eng.); KING EDWARD, supra note 41, at
56-57 (citing a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of 1293); Quintard-Mordnas, supra
note 11, at 126 n.176.
541 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
§ 262, at 158 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1872).
55 RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA: THROUGH THE AGES 123-24 (2003) (describing
statutes interpreting Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta during the reign of King Edward III in
England).56 Quintard-Morrnas, supra note 11, at 114 n.61.
571d. at 114 n.62.
58 Id. at 113 n.49; 1 CORPU, supra note 1, § 50.1.17.12, at 894.
59 With serious crimes, some were detained before trial but not treated harshly, and the
trial process was speedy so that the innocent could be discharged. Quintard-Morrnas, supra
note 11,at 113.
60 d. at 117, 126-30; see Bryan v. Comstock, 220 S.W. 475 (Ark. 1920) (noting that
arrests in public were formerly deemed oppresive, and arrests on Sunday prohibited).
61 Quintard-Mor~nas, supra note 11, at 128 (citing HENRY FIELDING, THE COVENT-
GARDEN JOURNAL AND A PLAN OF THE UNIVERSAL REGISTER-OFFICE 85 (Bertrand A.
Goldgard ed., Clarendon Press 1988) (1752)) (denouncing press that stated that a woman
poisoned her father before she was found guilty).62 Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
63 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
64 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
65 Id.; see Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1943).
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connected these rights to the Magna Carta and required courts to not impose
punishment "without due process of law." 66
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the U.S. tradition is that "one
charged with a crime is not, in ordinary circumstances, imprisoned until after a
judgment of guilt."' 67 However, it also became common practice among courts
to nominally recognize the pretrial presumption of innocence while in practice
set bail so high that it could not be reached by the accused.68 This practice also
extended to state courts. 69 Overall, though, due to the presumption of innocence
being rooted in due process principles, the courts generally waited until after
trial to impose any punishment or to incarcerate the accused.
D. Due Process Focused on Proving Legal Guilt at Trial
Historically, due process rights emphasized proving guilt of defendants
legally at trial and preserving innocence pretrial. In order to protect due process
rights and the presumption of innocence, early on, judges insisted on a trial and
a legal basis to convict.70 Coffin focused on the presumption of innocence as a
legal burden and specifically held that the presumption of innocence was
separate and distinct from the equally fundamental principle that the
prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.71 The
66 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963).
67 Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197 (1960); see also United States v.
Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Thus, until trial commences, enlargement on
bail is the rule, upon adequate assurance that the accused will appear at trial.").68 Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1495 (1966)
(noting that "courts have said that bail in an amount greater than the defendant can raise is
not necessarily excessive; the accused is entitled only to the opportunity to make bail in a
reasonable amount, not to such bail as he can provide").
69Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 257 A.2d 657, 660-61 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1969) (recognizing dangerousness as a permissible basis for detention without bail).
70 in McKinley's Case, Lord Gillies discusses the presumption of innocence:
I conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which has reason,
and religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed
in indelible characters in the heart of every judge .... To overtum this, there must be
legal evidence of guilt, carrying home a degree of conviction short only of absolute
certainty.
33 How. St. Tr. 275, 506 (1817); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895).
Coffin explains that the legal burden of proof is important because "'[in some cases
presumptive evidence goes far to prove a person guilty, though there be no express proof of
the fact to be committed by him."' Id. at 456 (quoting 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1847)). "This presumption on
the one hand, supplemented by any other evidence he may adduce, and the evidence against
him on the other, constitute the elements from which the legal conclusion of his guilt or
innocence is to be drawn." Id. at 459.
71 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 458-61 (emphasis added). Coffin emphasizes the Blackstone ratio
that it is "better five guilty persons should escape unpunished, than one innocent person
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Supreme Court initially made clear that the presumption of innocence was
separate and distinct from the prosecutor's burden of proof, but later on, the two
principles were merged into the prosecutor's burden at trial. 72 The separation of
these two principles is critical for the presumption of innocence applying
pretrial, and later cases ignored the presumption because they tied it to the
prosecutor's burden. 73
Nineteenth century courts noted that the proof required to find a person
guilty required a high degree of certainty,74 so much so that even if the
individual was deemed guilty, in some cases the jury was still required to
"presume his innocence" and find him innocent unless the burden of proof was
met. 75 For instance, the government could have clear evidence that a defendant
committed murder but the evidence, if it was obtained in violation of the
defendant's right to counsel, would be inadmissible, thus leading the defendant
to be acquitted. Legal scholars very much equated the presumption of innocence
with a legal burden and were less concerned with whether the defendant
actually committed the crime. 76
The trial was the pinnacle of due process and where a defendant's right to
innocence was protected. Judges focused so much on procedure and legal
innocence that some even encouraged criminal defendants to go to trial and
discouraged guilty pleas. 77 Eighteenth century judges sometimes asked
defendants to retract guilty pleas and some wanted to abolish guilty pleas and
substitute an examination of the defendant because it would "guard him against
undue conviction, brought on upon him by his own imbecility and
imprudence. '78 Blackstone also famously noted "all presumptive evidence of
should die." 1d. at 456 (quoting HALE, supra note 70, at 289). While there has been much
talk about the Blackstone ratio in terms of putting a convict to death, the actual quote refers
to innocent suffering as the outcome to be avoided. Cathy L. Bosworth, Pretrial Detainment:
The Fruitless Search for the Presumption of Innocence, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 277, 278 (1986).
72 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 458-61. But cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970).
73 See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-63.
74 R. v. White, (1865) 176 Eng. Rep. 611 (N.P.) 612 n.(a) (Eng.).
75 United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 539 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Unless and until the
Government meets its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of
innocence remains with the accused regardless of the fact that he has been charged with the
crime, regardless of what is said about him at trial, regardless of whether the jurors believe
that he is likely guilty, regardless of whether he is actually guilty. The presumption attaches
to those who are actually innocent and to those who are actually guilty alike throughout all
stages of the trial and deliberations unless and until that burden is met.").
76 Thayer, supra note 1, at 199.
77 Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1979); see also HALE, supra note 70, at 225 (discussing situations where the court will
advise a defendant to go to trial and refuse to record his confession).
78 Alschuler, supra note 77, at 8 (quoting 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 127 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827)) (internal quotations marks omitted)
(discussing Blackstone, who noted that judges were "very backward in receiving and
recording [a guilty plea] ... and generally advise[d] the prisoner to retract it" (quoting 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *329 (first alteration in original))). In the Stephen Wright trial
2011]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
felony should be admitted cautiously," emphasizing that evidence should be
found indirectly by a jury rather than admitted.79
However, over time, the focus on the presumption of innocence became
proving legal guilt at trial, not pretrial. And the presumption of innocence
became synonymous with the prosecutor's burden to prove an individual guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.80 Thus, the maxim of "innocent until proven guilty"
signified that jurors convict only when there was enough proof that the crime
was committed. 81 It lost its greater meaning that the defendant was protected
against any inferences or findings of guilt before trial. This change opened the
way for judges to make legal examinations of defendants' guilt pretrial, where
previously due process principles would not have allowed this.
In order to fully understand the change in the pretrial role of the
presumption of innocence in guaranteeing pretrial release without judicial
predictions, the next section provides a historical review of relevant U.S. cases
that changed these original principles.
1II. CHANGES TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND DUE PROCESS
Changes in state and federal laws between the 1960s and 1980s demonstrate
a shift in the meaning of due process and the presumption of innocence pretrial.
Until the 1950s, judges presumed bail for all noncapital defendants and were
only permitted to deny bail where there was a risk of flight.82 However, from
the late 1960s on, courts considered various factors, including the weight of the
evidence against an individual and how her release would impact the safety of
the community. 83 These changes in statutory laws attempting to "reform" bail
in 1743, where Wright tried to plead guilty to robbery to avoid trial in hopes that the death
sentence would not be imposed, the court said that it would not take note of favorable
circumstances until he agreed to trial. Id. at 9.
794 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *352; see also People v. Lohman, 2 Barb. 450, 451
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1848) ("All offenders are entitled before trial, to be bailed; but an
exception has been made by statute, in cases of homicide. In all cases it rests in the
discretion of the judge. The question for him to settle is, whether bail will secure the
appearance of the prisoner.").80 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 (1978); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 533 (1979) ("The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden
of proof in criminal trials... [and] has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.").
81 Laufer, supra note 10 at 332.
82 See, e.g., Lohman, 2 Barb. at 451 ("All offenders are entitled before trial, to be
bailed; but an exception has been made by statute, in cases of homicide. In all cases it rests
in the discretion of the judge. The question for him to settle is, whether bail will secure the
appearance of the prisoner.").
83 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(4)(a) (West 2011);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-43-2 (2004); United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.
1988) (holding that preventive detention is authorized under 18 USC § 3142(f) only if one of
the conditions listed in that section are met); State v. Olson, 152 N.W.2d 176, 178 (S.D.
1967) ("The granting of bail to a large extent is governed by the facts and circumstances of
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from the 1960s to the 1980s opened the door to increased detention by allowing
judges to make predictions about defendants' guilt and future proclivity to
commit crime. 84 As a result, bail is no longer presumed in most cases and
judges are given a greater ability to consider additional factors in determining
whether to release a person on bail. 85 The pretrial bail decision became whether
to release a person on bail rather than how to release the person on bail.
Early U.S. cases assert the importance of the right to bail and the
presumption of innocence, a few connecting it with due process rights. The next
section discusses the importance of the presumption of innocence and due
process in the evolution of U.S. bail rights.86
A. 1966 Act Allows Weighing of Evidence
In the 1960s, Congress unintentionally opened the way for predictions of
future guilt and pretrial weighing of evidence in the bail decision. The 1966
Federal Bail Reform Act strongly favored pretrial release, 87 in line with
historical notions that bail should be presumed for all noncapital defendants.88
Congress found that many judges were setting high bail amounts that
defendants could not meet, denying them real access to bail. 89 The 1966 Act
maintained that people only be denied bail if they would not appear for trial.90
each particular case."); Watkins v. Lamberti, No. 4D 11-894, 2011 WL 1084968, at * 1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2011) (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
denying bail "after consideration of the factors set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.131").
84 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); Bell, 441 U.S. at 533 ("The presumption of innocence
is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials .... [lit has no application
to the determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial
has even begun."); see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
86 See United States v. Scoblick, 124 F. Supp. 881, 889 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Carr v. State,
4 So. 2d 887, 888 (Miss. 1941) ("[Y]et there is no such sanctity in this assumption of
innocence which renders it immune to actual proof of guilt, or prolongs its life beyond that
moment when the reason and judgment of the jury accept the guilt of the defendant as
proven.").
87 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214; H.R. REP. No. 89-
1541, at 5, 8-9 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2299 (noting that this Act will
greatly increase pretrial release and reduce reliance on money bail and stating that "it is the
poor man, lacking sufficient funds, who remains incarcerated prior to trial"); id. at 5 ("The
purpose of [the Act] is to revise existing bail procedures in the courts of the United States
including the courts of the District of Columbia in order to assure that all persons, regardless
of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer
charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor
the public interest.").88 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90 Thus, the Act provided that persons charged with noncapital crimes were required to
be released before trial unless the judge "determine[d] ... that such a release [would] not
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The Bail Reform Act expanded the factors that judges could consider in
releasing an individual on bail. The Act did not take into account the perceived
"dangerousness" of the defendant, 91 but expanded the reasons judges could
legitimately deny bail. In addition, the 1966 Act allowed judges to consider the
"weight of the evidence against the person" in deciding whether to release
them.92 In such cases, the Act empowered judges to take several steps to restrict
defendants' release, including denying release. 93 However, and importantly, the
Act did preserve the presumption that all noncapital defendants should be
released on bail.94
While the 1966 Act placed some limits on the ability of courts to release
defendants pretrial, overall federal defendants were released in greater numbers
after the Act and the presumption of release pretrial remained.95 While the Act
favored release and, by some estimates, increased the release rate of federal
defendants by as much as 40%,96 it inadvertently paved the way for limits on
defendants' release rights. In defending the 1966 Act, the Department of Justice
made it clear that the presumption of innocence would have no application
reasonably assure the appearance of the accused as required" due to flight. H.R. REP. No.
89-1541, at 5-6.
91 See United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The structure of
the Act and its legislative history make it clear that in noncapital cases pretrial detention
cannot be premised upon an assessment of danger to the public should the accused be
released."); H.R. REP. No. 89-1541, at 5-6 ("This legislation does not deal with the problem
of the preventive detention of the accused .... It must be remembered that under American
criminal jurisprudence pretrial bail may not be used as a device to protect society from the
possible commission of additional crimes by the accused.").
92 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2) (2006). In making decisions as to whether a defendant's
appearance could be reasonably assured, judges could also consider "character, physical and
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, [the] length of [the
defendant's] residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to
drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history and, record concerning appearance[s] at court
proceedings[.]" Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
93 Id. § 3142(a)-(e); see also United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1978)
("The right to bail is thus not absolute but recognized and statutorily approved as being
generally available in noncapital cases subject to denial in exceptional cases .... (emphasis
added)).
94 18 U.S.C. § 31420); see Abrahams, 575 F.2d at 8 ("The right to bail is thus not
absolute but recognized and statutorily approved as being generally available in noncapital
cases subject to denial in exceptional cases .... (emphasis added)).
95 Gavino v. McMahon, 499 F.2d 1191, 1195 (2d Cir. 1974). Courts interpreting the
Act recognized its limitations on the power of judges to order detention. The Second Circuit
noted that "[allthough the trial judge is accorded discretionary power during trial to revoke
bail where such drastic relief is essential ... such power.., does not extend to revocation of
bail before trial." Id. (emphasis added).
96 The 1966 Federal Bail Reform Act had a significant impact on the release rate of
federal defendants, which increased by as much as 40%. See WAYNE H. THOMAs, BAIL
REFORM IN AMERICA 27 (1976).
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pretrial as it was purely a rule of "evidence." 97 With a declining emphasis on
the presumption of innocence and courts now possessing more discretion in
pretrial decisions, the 1966 Act paved the way for courts to consider additional
factors, besides flight risk, in deciding whether to release someone on bail.
Given this increased discretion, the 1966 Act also led to public scrutiny of
violent crimes by people released pretrial.98 This scrutiny led to some
jurisdictions enacting laws that permitted judges to consider the dangerousness
of the defendant, even though the 1966 Act expressly prohibited such
considerations. 99
While the immediate result of the 1966 Bail Reform Act was that more
defendants were released, the long-term impact was a rationale that allowed for
increased detention. The Act led to a further expansion of discretion for judges
to weigh evidence against defendants before trial-violating due process
principles historically requiring this legal determination to occur only at trial. 100
Judges were also granted more discretion in predicting which defendants were
likely to commit additional crimes-violating historic presumption of
innocence principles-requiring that bail only be refused for flight risk. 101
Following the 1966 Act, courts continued to connect the principles of due
process with the presumption of innocence-explicitly and implicitly. 10 2
Indeed, the Court explicitly wedded the presumption of innocence to the Due
Process Clause. 103 In re Winship stated that to give "concrete substance" to the
presumption of innocence, the Due Process Clause required the prosecutor to
97 See Brown v. United States, 410 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1969) (relying on the
Department's analysis of the Act to conclude "there is no conflict between Rule 46(f) and
the Bail Reform Act").98 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189
(quoting a study in D.C. that reported 13% rearrest rates for felony defendants and among
some groups of defendants 25% rearrest rates (surety bond), and concluding that the
"disturbing" recidivism rates "require[] the law to recognize that the danger a defendant may
pose to others should receive at least as much consideration in the pretrial release
determination as the likelihood that he will not appear for trial").
99 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146, 80 Stat. 214.The first states to
consider dangerousness as a factor in making pretrial release determinations were Alaska
(1967), Delaware (1967), Maryland (1969), South Carolina (1969), and Vermont (1967). See
Mary A. Toborg & John P. Bellassai, Attempts to Predict Pretrial Violence: Research
Findings and Legislative Responses, in THE PREDICTION OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 101, 107
n.24 (Femand N. Dutile & Cleon H. Foust eds., 1987).
100 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
101 United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985).
102The Supreme Court made clear that due process required "that no man should lose
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of... convincing the factfinder of his
guilt." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525-26 (1959)).
103 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence,
though not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice.").
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persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.104 While connecting the Due
Process Clause to the presumption of innocence, the Court failed to recognize
that due process principles were critical in guaranteeing bail rights. The Court
emphasized that defendants should be released and that liberty should be
preserved before trial. 10 5 This was a historic departure from precedent tying
both due process and the presumption of innocence with pretrial rights.
The failure to recognize the importance of due process and the presumption
of innocence pretrial allowed the Court to equate these principles with the
prosecutor's burden of proof. Following this change in tide,' 0 6 the Court in
Taylor v. Kentucky decided that Coffin was in error when it stated that the
principles of the presumption of innocence and the prosecution bearing the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt were separate and distinct. 10 7 Taylor
asserted that though guilt should be determined at trial, the presumption of
innocence was just one way to express this right to a jury. 10 8 In equating the
presumption of innocence with the prosecutor's burden of proof, the Court
emphasized the import of the presumption of innocence and due process at trial,
rather than pretrial and also robbed it of its initial import in guaranteeing bail. 109
With changes in constitutional protections pretrial, courts recalibrated the
level of rights they granted pretrial detainees. Clearly, detainees should not be
treated like convicts, but courts still had to determine what restrictions could be
made on their liberty in accord with due process and the presumption of
innocence while in detention. Generally, in order to justify a restriction of
pretrial defendants' rights, courts required a compelling necessity for prison
safety. 110 They emphasized that pretrial defendants should be entitled to the
104 Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. The Court later echoed the link between the presumption
and due process by pointing out that "[t]he right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503.
105 Winship, 397 U.S. at 367. The Court expressly affirmed that the state cannot punish
without due process, and more specifically held that the accused maintain "freedom from
bodily restraint" that is protected except in accordance with due process of law. Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977). The Court was clear in several cases that an
adjudication was required to satisfy the demands of due process and to deny this basic
fundamental right of freedom from bodily restraint and punishment. See also Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
106 Another indication of the change in tide occurred in 1970 when Congress passed a
District of Columbia act that was a precursor to a similar national bail reform that went into
effect in 1984. The D.C. act allowed detention before trial based on safety to the community
and other factors for serious crimes. After enactment of the D.C. statute, twelve additional
states enacted laws patterned after it. Toborg & Bellassai, supra note 99, at 107 nn.25-26.
107 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1978).
10 8 Id. at 485.
1091d.
110 Bosworth, supra note 71, at 279; Detainees of the Brooklyn House v. Malcolm, 520
F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying the compelling necessity test in a case concerning
inhumane and unsanitary living conditions in New York detention centers). Indeed,
administrative inconvenience and economic constraints are not compelling necessities for
limiting detainees' rights. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1237 (2d Cir. 1979).
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presumption of innocence as they "have not been convicted and sentenced to
jail."111 Other courts, however, reasoned that pretrial defendants' guilt was
"probable" and deferred more to prison officials. 112
These cases paved the way for Bell v. Wolfish, 113 which casts a doubt on the
principle that pretrial detention should be a rare exception due to the
presumption of innocence, which applies from arrest throughout the trial to ban
restraints on liberty.1 14 Bell dealt with a constitutional challenge to conditions at
a temporary detention center that required pretrial detainees to share a room,
prohibited them from receiving certain books or packages, and subjected them
to mandatory body-cavity searches following outsider visits.115
In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the pretrial confinement conditions as
constitutional while discounting the application of the presumption of
innocence. The Court echoed Taylor in holding that the presumption of
innocence is a "doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials."'1 16
Though it plays "an important role in our criminal justice system," the Court
said it "has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee
during confinement before his trial has even begun."' 17 While Bell did deal a
drastic blow to the presumption of innocence, its holding was clearly limited to
defendants detained pretrial.' 1 8 Bell did not close the door to the presumption of
innocence or due process rights ever applying pretrial, but simply stated that
they did not apply during pretrial confinement.119 Bell also made clear that
restrictions on a defendant's pretrial liberty are not only limited to those aimed
at ensuring their presence at trial. 120 Some liberty limits can be imposed to
maintain security at a pretrial detention facility. 121 The exception Bell made for
preserving liberty while in confinement is one that historically was not required
because there was not a big window of time between arrest and trial.
111 Inmates of Milwaukee Cnty. Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1159-60 (E.D. Wis.
1973).
112 Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1003-04 (5th Cir. 1979). The court here found that
the jail in question, while having questionable medical care, physical facilities'
overcrowding, and more, was not unfit for human habitation. Id. at 997.
113441 U.S. 520 (1979).
114See Lester, supra note 10, at 10.
115 Bell, 441 U.S. at 530.
116Id. at 533.
117 Id.
118d. at 560-61.
119 d at 533, 537. To further explain, the Court said that "the Due Process Clause
protects a detainee from certain conditions and restrictions of pretrial detainment,"
demonstrating that the Due Process Clause still applies in a real way to protect defendants
before trial. Id. at 533, 535-40.
120d. at 539-40.
121 Bell, 447 U.S. at 540. The government needs to manage detention facilities beyond
ensuring that defendants show up at trial, including concerns for preventing weapons or
drugs from reaching detainees. Id.
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Bell also held that due process only requires that pretrial detainees be free
from "punishment," 122 rather than from a restraint of liberty-even though
historically it has required both. This decision represented an unnecessary,
though major, shift in the Court's jurisprudence involving the presumption of
innocence. 123 In determining whether certain restrictive confinement practices
of a federal prison violated pretrial detainee's rights, the Court said that
"punishment" does not exist if it is "reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective." 124 Although Bell dealt with the conditions of
detention and not detention itself, the logic of the case seemed to indicate that
such detention was constitutional and not considered punishment, provided it
could be construed as a "regulatory restraint." 125 To determine if the
presumption of innocence or due process was violated the Court could have
considered whether any of the conditions allows judges to determine guilt of
certain defendants or disadvantage them at trial. 126
The ruling in Bell changed several things. Bell v. Wolfish set the stage for
expanding pretrial detention based on other factors by holding that pretrial
detention is not punishment if related to a legitimate governmental objective. 127
122I. at 536-37.
12 3 See id. at 533 ("The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden
of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to judge an
accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis of
suspicions that may arise from the fact of his arrest, indictment, or custody, or from other
matters not introduced as proof at trial."). Compare Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398
(1993) ("A person when first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of
innocence.... ."), with Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) ("The statutes as to bail
upon arrest and before trial provide that 'bail may be admitted' upon all arrests in capital
cases, and 'shall be admitted' upon all arrests in other criminal cases ...." (quoting 1 REV.
STAT. §§ 1014-1016 (1875))).
124 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
125 Id. at 537. Bell thus echoed the detention justifications presented in the immigration
context in Carlson. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court examined
these conditions and determined that not being allowed books or food from outside of the
institution does not constitute punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560-61.
126As demonstrated in Part V, none of these conditions seems to do so and each is more
closely related to maintaining the security of the people in the facility rather than inferring
the guilt of certain defendants. If there was a condition, for instance, limited visits for
pretrial detainees, this would disadvantage a defendant in preparing for trial and would
violate the presumption of innocence.
127 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. The Court in Bell also separated the doctrines of presumption
of innocence and the compelling necessity test, rejecting the latter in favor of a
reasonableness standard, given the special circumstances of pretrial detention. Id. at 532; see
Anthony B. Quinn, Case Note, Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979), 1979 BYU L. REV.
1022, 1027-33. Bell has been upheld. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984)
(holding that Rutherford's attempt to depart from Wolfish was not acceptable and that prison
officials must be given a great deal of deference in order to maintain prison security). But
see id. at 600 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that because people who are convicted and
incarcerated retain their constitutional rights, pretrial detainees, who are presumptively
innocent persons, are certainly entitled to the same rights).
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The Court recognizes that due process does not allow punishment, 128 but fails to
recognize that due process and the presumption of innocence historically
required liberty-or release on bail. This reasoning, which was unnecessary to
uphold the detention conditions in Bell, opens the way for pretrial detainees to
be treated like convicts. 129
With shifts in federal bail law in Bell and the 1966 Act, a few states
changed their laws to allow consideration of factors other than flight risk in
noncapital cases.130 Initially, bail was determined by considering the flight risk
of the individual, but a few courts in the 1960s began to analyze evidence to
determine whether a defendant was guilty before trial.' 3'
128 Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.
129 See infra Part V.
130 In the 1960s, Iowa statutorily added factors to consider in the bail decision to "assure
appearance" including: "the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the
defendant's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition,
[and] the length of his residence in the community." State v. Fenton, 170 N.W.2d 678, 679-
80 (Iowa 1969) (quoting 1967 Iowa Acts 805) (denying bail on a rape charge). Also, in
Pennsylvania, the court allowed consideration of several factors to ensure the defendant's
appearance in court. Commonwealth ex rel. Hartage v. Hendrick, 268 A.2d 451, 452 n. 1 (Pa.
1970) (considering: "(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the stage of the
prosecution then existing; (2) The age, residence, employment, financial standing and family
status of the defendant; (3) Defendant's character, reputation and previous criminal history;
and (4) Defendant's mental condition." (quoting PA. R. CRIM. P. 4005(a) (1970)) (current
version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 523(a) (West 2011))). While these factors took a step beyond
flight risk, neither statute allowed the judge to predict guilt or dangerousness or allowed any
weighing of evidence as would occur at a trial. Fenton, 170 N.W.2d at 680; Hartage, 268
A.2d at 452, n. I.
131 In 1969, a Pennsylvania court determined that prediction of future crimes was
appropriate pretrial where there was a "predictable threat to the community."
Commonwealth ex rel. Ford v. Hendrick, 257 A.2d 657, 662 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969). In
another case, a New York court held that revoking bail was permissible considering the
nature of the offenses (possession of explosions, extortion, and coercion), the defendant's
past criminal record, and the unexplained drowning of a witness. People ex rel. Calascione v.
Ramsden, 246 N.Y.S.2d 84, 90 (App. Div. 1963) (noting that another witness's shop was
also blasted). In another case, People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 255 N.E.2d 552, 555-56
(N.Y. 1969), the court considered safety to witnesses as a valid consideration though not
enough alone. In 1970, a court went even further in People v. Melville, holding that a
defendant charged with bombing six occupied buildings was a danger to the community. 308
N.Y.S.2d 671, 673, 680 (Crim. Ct. 1970). But see Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1397
(Alaska 1974) (holding that the 1966 Bail Reform Act does not allow detention without bail
and that a law allowing detention without the right to bail would be "unconstitutional unless
a constitutional amendment were adopted"). In 1976, forty states still had constitutional
guarantees to bail dating from early colonial days, though since that time, some states have
amended their constitutions to allow pretrial detention. Donald B. Verilli, Jr., The Eighth
Amendment and the Right to Bail.- Historical Perspectives, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 328, 353
(1982).
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B. 1984 Act Restricts Pretrial Liberty Based on Community Safety
The trend of decreasing pretrial rights continued though the 1980s with an
increase in pretrial judicial predictions and little acknowledgement of the
presumption of innocence. In two separate appeals, the D.C. Court of Appeals
affirmed the constitutionality of a D.C. law that allowed detention based on
predictions of future bad conduct.132 Interestingly, in upholding the
constitutionality of the Act, the court said the statute was intended to prevent
"reasonably predictable conduct, not to punish for prior acts." 133 The D.C.
Court implied that it was appropriate for judges to predict future conduct for
detainees, though it was not appropriate to punish for prior acts without trial. 134
Both of these actions have historically been prohibited by judges pretrial.
Courts also started to ignore due process protections requiring a conviction
by a jury in order to detain a defendant. For instance, the D.C. Circuit
determined that if there was "competent evidence" presented to a judge, even
without the protections of trial, a defendant's liberty could be denied without
violating her due process rights. 135 Thus, the court allowed reliance on
"competent evidence" to detain someone, whereas previously, a conviction after
a jury verdict was required. 136
Restricting accuseds' rights based on "community safety" and without a
determination of guilt are themes that soon extended to the Supreme Court. In
1984, Schall v. Martin involved a challenge to the constitutionality of New
York's juvenile pretrial detention scheme allowing detention when there was a
serious risk that a juvenile might commit a crime.13 7 The Supreme Court upheld
the scheme under the Due Process Clause, 138 based on concerns for community
132 De Veau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1313-14 (D.C. 1982) (holding there is no
constitutional right to bail); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326, 1331 (D.C.
1981) (same).
133 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1332.
1341d. The court emphasized that the Act did not go beyond what was reasonable to
"protect the safety of the community" pending trial. Id. at 1332-33 (requiring that detention
be no longer than sixty days, after which the defendant must either receive bail or go to trial,
and allowing a judge to end the detention whenever a "'subsequent event has eliminated the
basis for such detention"' (quoting D.C. CODE § 23-1322(d)(2)(B) (1973))).
135 Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 529, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In a case defending
the D.C. Code, at least one court required a low bar of proof to rebut the presumption of
innocence. Instead of requiring a determination of guilt by a jury, the court argued that "the
presumption of innocence is an active factor weighing on whether [the defendant] should be
released or not, once that presumption is rebutted by competent evidence and it is
determined that [the defendant] must be confined, the effect of the presumption is largely in
repose until the time of trial." See id. at 568.
1361d. at 568.
137467 U.S. 253, 255-56 (1984).
13 8 Id. at 256-57. While the majority did not consider the presumption of innocence, the
dissent discussed the serious issues inherent with denying liberty interests to presumptively
innocent defendants. See id. at 281-309 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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safety from crime. 139 The Court held that restrictive conditions placed on
juveniles satisfied a "regulatory" purpose, posing no violation to due process. 140
This was one of the first pretrial detention cases where the Court directly
decided that a government objective-other than ensuring a defendant's
presence at trial-allowed confinement. 141 In upholding detention designed to
protect the community from future crimes, Schall paved the way for the
justification of pretrial detention on a larger scale. What is more, Schall directly
violated historical mandates of bail under the Due Process Clause, which were
solely that the defendant return to court, not to prevent future crimes.
Within months of the Court's decision in Schall, an emboldened Congress
passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984.142 The 1966 Act was considered too liberal
in releasing defendants, 143 and the 1984 Act was enacted to deal with what the
public perceived as the high number of crimes committed pretrial. 144 The 1984
Act contained much of the language of the 1966 Act, which provided that a
defendant should be released if her presence at trial could be reasonably
guaranteed. 14 5
The 1984 Act was a significant departure from the longstanding tradition
that allowed pretrial detention only to assure appearance of the accused at
139 1d. at 264 (majority opinion).
140Id. at 269-71.
141 Id. at 264. But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (setting forth
procedures for indefinite civil confinement of prisoners, convicted of sex offenses, who are
deemed dangerous due to mental abnormality). In Schall, the Court explained that the state
has a "'legitimate and compelling state interest"' in protecting society from crime. Schall
467 U.S. at 264 (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)). Although this may
be weighed against the juvenile's liberty interest, which is also substantial, this "interest
must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody." Id. at 265.
142 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988). Though the D.C. Code had procedural safeguards
that dissuaded prosecutors from using it very often, see Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim,
Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335,346-47 (1990), these were absent
from the mirror Bail Reform Act of 1984. Id. at 347.
143 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3187, 3188
("'Increasingly, the [1966 Bail Reform] Act has come under criticism as too liberally
allowing release and as providing too little flexibility to judges in making appropriate release
decisions regarding defendants who pose serious risks of flight or danger to the
community.' ... If a court believes that a defendant poses such a danger, it faces a
dilemma-either it can release the defendant prior to trial despite these fears, or it can find a
reason, such as risk of flight, to detain the defendant (usually by imposing high money
bond). In the Committee's view, it is intolerable that the law denies judges the tools to make
honest and appropriate decisions regarding the release of such defendants." (quoting U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT
(1981))).
1441d. at 6 (noting that the Bail Reform Act fails to recognize the crimes committed by
those on pretrial release and that both the President and Chief Justice have urged amendment
of federal bail laws to deal with this problem).
145 Id. at 5.
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trial. 146 First, judges making bail decisions could, for the first time, take into
account the danger to the community posed by the defendant's release.147 The
Act thus made the prediction of the "dangerousness" inquiry that it had
condoned in previous cases for capital crimes explicit, now expanding it to
other crimes of violence and drug offenses. 148 Second, courts could continue to
consider the weight of the evidence against a defendant in determining
release. 149
The first controversial change soon developed a split among the circuits
regarding whether the 1984 Act met the demands of the Due Process Clause in
allowing considerations of dangerousness and detention based on a prediction
of future crimes. 150 Most circuits upheld the Act against challenges but the
146 See, e.g., 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 114 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1894)
("THAT In all Cases whatsoever Bayle by sufficient Suretyes Shall be allowed and taken
unlesse for treason or felony plainly and specially Expressed and menconed in the Warrant
of Committment provided Alwayes that nothing herein contained shall Extend to discharge
out of prison upon bayle any person taken in Execucon for debts or otherwise legally
sentenced by the Judgment of any of the Courts of Record within the province."); see Bandy
v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197 (1960); United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444
(2d Cir. 1961).
147 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (2006).
148 Section 3142(f) provides certain categories that subject a person to detention: those
charged with "a crime of violence; an offense for which the maximum sentence is life
imprisonment or death"; drug offenses which carry a maximum sentence greater than ten
years; repeat felony offenders; or if the defendant poses a "serious risk" of flight, obstructs
justice, see United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1988), or "threaten[s], injure[s],
or intimidate[s]" a witness or juror, see United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.
1985). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
149 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). Under the 1984 Act, courts could consider the "weight of
evidence against the person; the history and characteristics of the person ... [and] the nature
and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the
person's release." Id. § 314 2 (g). A magistrate holds a hearing to determine if the defendant
is charged with a capital crime, a crime of violence or a drug offense. Id. § 3142(f). Then a
presumption of dangerousness is created and the magistrate must determine by "clear and
convincing evidence" that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the safety. . . [and] the appearance of [the defendant]." Id. § 3142(e)-(f).
150 Compare United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
the 1984 Act does not violate the Due Process Clause), United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d
1102, 1103 (1 1th Cir. 1986) ("We agree with the Seventh and Third Circuits that allowing
pretrial detention because of potential dangerousness of the accused is constitutional."),
United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 547, 549 (1st Cir. 1986) (reversing the decision to
release a defendant indicted with multiple counts of racketeering, loan sharking, gambling,
predicate acts of two murders, and four conspiracies to commit murder because the evidence
"appears strong," his charges "are of the gravest order," and if he were convicted of all he
would face 130 years of prison), United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 114 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that due process was not violated by preventative detention if "procedural
safeguards" are put into place, such as those in trial), and United States v. Accettoruo, 783
F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that due process was a "flexible," case-by-case
concept and arbitrary lines should not be drawn regarding when "defendants adjudged to be
flight risks or dangers to the community should be released pending trial"), with United
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Second Circuit held that detention based on dangerousness alone violates the
Due Process Clause. 151 The Second Circuit emphasized that while releasing an
accused person "thought to be dangerous" is risky, this risk was constitutionally
mandated. 152 It did not support using incarceration to "protect society" from
future crimes the government fears they may commit. And thus, the Second
Circuit would have upheld the principle that the Due Process Clause does not
permit detention of those who are not convicted of a crime.
The Supreme Court resolved this split among the circuits, upholding the
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 in United States v. Salerno.153
By the time Salerno was decided, the recognized purposes of bail had evolved
from ensuring the defendant's presence at trial to more explicit public safety
justifications that neglected pretrial due process. 154 The Court also mentioned
that a defendant may be detained if he presents a danger to a witness, 155 and the
government has a compelling interest in preventing dangerousness generally. 156
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 988, 1003 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to base pretrial detention on dangerousness alone).
151 Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 988, 1003-04 (noting that detention to prevent future
crime "can constitutionally occur only after conviction"). The court also notes that the
Eighth Amendment and "the history of bail suggest[] that dangerousness is not a permissible
ground for pretrial detention," and that even if there was not an absolute right to bail in all
cases, it was primarily denied on the basis of flight risk. Id. at 997. The decision explained,
"The Due Process Clause reflects the constitutional imperative that incarceration to protect
society from criminals may be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past
crimes and not as regulation of those feared likely to commit future crimes." Id. at 1001
(emphases added). Furthermore, "all guarantees of liberty entail risks, and under our
Constitution those guarantees may not be abolished whenever government prefers that a risk
not be taken." Id. at 1003. Chief Justice Feinberg, in his concurrence, distinguished Schall,
noting that the decision was limited because the maximum detention possible was seventeen
days and was for the juvenile's own protection and allowed the court to pursue the best
interests of the child. Id. at 1006-08 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring). Under the Bail Reform
Act, the detention may be much longer, it involves competent adults, and the state does not
consider the best interests of the detainees. Id. at 1008.
152I. at 1002-03 (majority opinion).
153 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) ("Even outside the exigencies of
war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention
of dangerous persons.").154 Following Bell, the Salerno Court held that "preventing danger to the community is a
legitimate regulatory goal." Id. at 747. The Court also noted that there are other situations in
which it has held that public safety trumps individual liberty interests: detaining alien
enemies in time of war, detaining individuals in time of insurrection, detaining resident
aliens prior to deportation, detaining mentally unstable individuals, and detaining dangerous
defendants who are incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 748-49.
155Id. at 749.
156 1d. Marshall wrote a scathing dissent, arguing that the Bail Reform Act specifically
states that it does not modify or limit the presumption of innocence, citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 31420): "The majority's untenable conclusion that the present Act is constitutional arises
from a specious denial of the role of the ... Due Process Clause in protecting the invaluable
guarantee afforded by the presumption of innocence." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 762-63
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Salerno determined that pretrial detention, as it relates to the Bail Reform Act,
does not constitute punishment and therefore does not violate the Due Process
Clause. 157 The Salerno decision did not even mention the presumption of
innocence. 158 And thus, without much discussion, the Salerno Court neglected
the application of pretrial due process and the presumption of innocence,
upholding the 1984 Act.
Over time, states increasingly changed their positions to reflect the federal
one. 15 9 Some states still hold true to the common law principle that defendants
have an absolute right to bail for noncapital crimes. 160 And some states resisted
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He went on to distinguish the presumption of innocence from the
burden of the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and said that both are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," established under the Due Process Clause. Id. at
763 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
157 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
158Id. at 739-55. Bell had made clear only that the presumption of innocence and due
process did not limit conditions placed on pretrial defendants in confinement; it did not
clearly establish that due process did not apply to limit predictions made by judges about
defendants pretrial. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). And there was still cause to
believe that Congress thought the presumption of innocence still applied to bail since the
1984 Act specifically mentioned that nothing in the Act was intended to modify or limit the
presumption of innocence. 18 U.S.C. § 31420) (2006). Arguably, if the presumption of
innocence did not apply pretrial at all, it would not be necessary for a bail statute to even
mention it.
159 Where California courts once disapproved of considering public safety in
determining bail, in 1987 the California legislature amended its penal code to make public
safety the primary factor for the court to consider in setting bail. Gray v. Superior Court, 23
Cal. Rptr. 3d 50, 58 (Ct. App. 2005). In 2000, a Louisiana court emphasized that the purpose
of bail was not "to protect the public" from harms the defendant may cause while released,
but to ensure her appearance at trial. Harper v. Layrisson, 764 So. 2d 1061, 1065-66 (La. Ct.
App. 2000); see also Nicholas v. Cochran, 673 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
("The purpose of bail is to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent
proceedings and to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal
defendant." (emphasis added)).
160 Ex parte Colbert, 805 So. 2d 687, 688 (Ala. 2000) (internal citations omitted). As far
as release on bail, twenty-seven states retain statutes, constitutional provisions, or criminal
rules that define capital offenses generally as being non-bailable. See ALA. CODE § 15-13-3
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (repealed 2010); ARiz. REV. STAT.
§ 13-3961 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-110 (2011); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1270.5 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-101 (2011); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2103(a) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(4)(a) (West Supp.
2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2903 (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-4 (West 2011); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-2 (West 2004); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 29(2);
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.484(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 13; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1101(C) (West Supp. 2011); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5701 (West Supp. 2011); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1 (LexisNexis
2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7553 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(B)-(D) (2011);
WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.2(a) (West Supp. 2011). Additionally, twenty-one jurisdictions
define other specific crimes as being nonbailable. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3961
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reducing bail rights because of due process concerns. 161 As new laws narrowed
the scope of the presumption of innocence, courts expanded the factors used to
justify pretrial detention, which now include: (1) the weight of the evidence
against the defendant, 162 (2) protection of the court's own processes, and (3)
community safety. 163
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-110 (2011); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-101 (Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-64a(b)(1) (West
Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.041(4)(a) (West Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
4516 (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-4 (West Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
33-8-3.5 (West Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-202 (LexisNexis 2010);
MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 765.5 (West 2000); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 178.484(1)-(5) (LexisNexis 2011); N.M. CONST. art. H, § 13; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § l101(C) (West 2011); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 15; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-20-1 (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN, tit. 13, § 7553 (2009); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-120(C)-(E) (Supp. 2011); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRI. R 3.2(a) (West 2011). California
defines capital crimes as being non-bailable either where "the facts are evident or the
presumption great," or for specific felonies. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; cf Henley v. Taylor,
918 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ark. 1996); State v. Hill, 444 S.E.2d 255, 257 (S.C. 1994) (noting that
a rebuttable presumption arises in capital cases that the defendant is not entitled to bail and
the defendant has a burden of production in showing he is not a danger to the community);
In re Steigler, 250 A.2d 379, 382 (Del. 1969) (holding that the state must bear the burden to
demonstrate the "proof is positive or the presumption great"). Moreover, three jurisdictions
have defined sexual assault as non-bailable. See ARiz. CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 12; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 9. In Arizona, there are only five categories of crimes that are
non-bailable: capital offenses, sexual assault, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen,
molestation of child under fifteen, and serious felonies where "there is probable cause to
believe that the person has entered or remained in the United States illegally." ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3961 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
161 For instance, in 1993 a Massachusetts court struck down amendments to its bail
scheme that went beyond the Federal Bail Reform Act, holding that they "infringe on the
individual interest in freedom from detention" and core due process rights, punish a broader
swath of crimes, and permit "unbridled discretion" by not imposing a burden of clear and
convincing evidence. Aime v. Commonwealth, 611 N.E.2d 204, 210, 213-14 (Mass. 1993).
The state legislature responded by passing new provisions with more procedural protections,
which were upheld. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58A (Supp. 2011), upheld in Mendoza v.
Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 22, 25 (Mass. 1996)).162 Today, some states consider the nature of the crime. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States,
705 A.2d 270, 272 (D.C. 1997); State v. LeDoux, No. A08-0260, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1532, at *2, *8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 2008) (holding that bail amounts of $50,000
on child-pornography charges and $200,000 on a first-degree criminal sexual-conduct
charge with a nine-year-old girl were not excessive because these were "serious offenses").
Some states also consider the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Yording v. Walker, 683 P.2d
788, 791 (Colo. 1984); Blackwell v. Sessums, 284 So. 2d 38, 39 (Miss. 1973) (affirming bail
denial where the evidence conflicted on whether the proof was evident that defendant was
guilty based on the evidence). Many states consider the defendant's past conduct. See, e.g.,
State v. Dodson, 556 S.W.2d 938, 944-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (past conduct of defendant
indicated he would be harmful to community where defendant committed murder while on
release for another murder charge). But see State ex rel. Ghiz v. Johnson, 183 S.E.2d 703,
706 (W. Va. 1971) (reversing denial of bail because among other reasons, trial judge did not
consider defendant's lack of prior criminal history). Further, many states consider the risk to
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
C. New Bail Standards Allow Pretrial Decisions About Guilt
As intended, the 1984 Bail Reform Act was effective in increasing pretrial
detention. 164 While the 1984 Act standard was arguably high, once the
floodgates had been opened for judges to predict what a defendant would do on
release, bail as a presumption for all became a relic of the past. And more
offensive to due process principles than the permission courts have been granted
other persons, community, or property in determining whether to release an individual. See,
e.g., Gilbert v. State, 540 P.2d 485, 486 (Alaska 1975) (holding that the judge may consider
"danger to the community" in setting bail); In re Weiner, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174 (Ct. App.
1995) ("The court in setting, reducing, or denying bail must primarily consider the public
safety."); Wheeler v. State, 864 A.2d 1058, 1066 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (holding that
detention of a defendant without bail was appropriate where there was clear and convincing
evidence that he posed a danger to his neighbors). And finally, at least one circuit considers
dangerousness of the defendant specifically. See, e.g., United States v. Kisling, 334 F.3d
734, 735 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing government's burden to prove risk of harm caused
by defendant).
163 18 U.S.C. § 3142(t) (2006); see Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1163-64 (8th Cir.
1981) (citing multiple cases for each main factor). For discussion of the fifty states'
consideration of other factors besides flight risk, see supra note 162. There are often
additional subfactors aimed at predicting which defendants are most likely to flee, interfere
with the court's processes or endanger the community. See United States v. Holmes, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Congress, which stated that these "additional
factors for the most part go to the issue of community safety, an issue which may not be
considered in the pretrial release decision under the ... [ 1966 Bail Reform Act]").
164The 1984 Act increased the number of federal prisoners by 32% in 1985. See
Howard Kurtz, Detention Law Further Crowds Prisons, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1986, at A4 (as
of 1986, the federal prison system was 42% overcapacity). Some have argued that the Act's
effect on the crime rate was ambiguous, however. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 142, at
383-88. I analyze this issue in a forthcoming article. See also United States v. Daniels, 772
F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The new bail statute increases the number of people
confined pending trial and pending appeal."). As the Court upheld the Bail Reform Act,
many courts began to weigh in on how to apply the Act and who should bear the burden to
prove detention. One of the most widely cited cases, still followed today, is United States v.
Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985). The First Circuit, as well as other district courts, found
that once a presumption of detention is created by a charge against a defendant, the burden
of production shifts to the defendant to prove that he can safely be released. Id. at 382, 386.
If the defendant produces evidence and satisfies his burden, the magistrate will "keep the
presumption in mind in making a decision" but still must find by clear and convincing
evidence to assure appearance of defendant or protect the community. Id. at 379, 382, 386;
see, e.g., United States v. Gossett, No. IP 05-82-CR-07 M/F, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14938,
at * 11-12 (S.D. Ind. July 19, 2005) (holding that defendant did not rebut the presumption of
dangerousness and that she could be detained because there was a strong probability she
would be convicted of drug trafficking, and because she fled a prior court proceeding);
United States v. Jointer, No. IP 04-0396M-01, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11839, at *12-14
(S.D. Ind. May 17, 2005) (holding that the defendant accused of the drug offense could be
detained because he did not rebut the presumption that he was a danger to the community
and the evidence showed he had an active and integral role in the drug trafficking
conspiracy, and there was a strong probability of conviction).
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to determine which defendants are dangerous, is the license courts have to
weigh the evidence against defendants to determine whether they should be
released.
United States v. Freitas shows how the Bail Reform Act allows a judge to
weigh the evidence against a defendant in determining whether she should be
released. 165 It demonstrates that the nature of the Act's inquiry allows the judge
to conduct an abbreviated mini-trial to determine whether the defendant is
guilty and whether she is likely to commit a crime while on release. Here, the
defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine. The court
determined that if there was probable cause to believe the defendant had
committed a serious drug offense like the one with which defendant was
charged, 166 then "a rebuttable presumption" arises such that no condition could
assure that the defendant would appear in court or that he would not pose a
threat to the community. 167 The court found probable cause, as the agents found
the defendant sleeping next to the components of a meth lab. 168 Thus, the
rebuttable presumption arose. The defendant then satisfied his burden of
production to rebut this presumption by showing that he had faithfully appeared
in court in the past.169 However, the court held that even though the defendant
rebutted the presumption, he should still be detained because "[t]he weight of
the evidence against the accused is substantial.' 170 The court found that because
the evidence indicates that the "defendant is deeply involved in illegal drug
activity," he should not be released, as Congress intended to reduce danger to
the community in pretrial release. 171
The Freitas court essentially found that the defendant was guilty of drug
manufacturing, rather than considering whether he would appear in court. There
was no mention of evidence suggesting that he would not appear in court for
165 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1294-95 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
166A rebuttable presumption does not "arise[] merely by the fact of indictment," and
"[a]lthough the indictment may be considered, there must be an independent factual basis
establishing probable cause that the offense charged was committed." United States v. Cox,
635 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (D. Kan. 1986) (explaining the use of the rebuttable presumption
because, with as "fundamental a right as personal liberty-the right to remain free from
detention" should come with "all of the traditional safeguards of a criminal trial-a heavier
standard for establishing probable cause is required").
167 Freitas, 602 F. Supp. at 1286.
168M. at 1294. There was also evidence of equipment used in making meth found in
storage lockers used and rented by the defendant, police investigating the residence due to
chemical odors, and prior to the search, agents receiving reports that the defendant was
involved in meth manufacturing. Id.
169 1d. The court noted that the defendant's mother offered to let him live with her and
act as custodian to satisfy that he would not commit any additional crimes. Id
170 d. Thus, the court found that none of the release conditions seemed to ensure he
would appear and cease illegal activity. Id.
171 Id. at 1295. Further, the court noted he had a lengthy criminal history and was on
release from a rape charge. Id.
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trial. 172 Freitas demonstrates that all the evidence presented pretrial goes to the
merits of the case, which is determined at a brief detention hearing where
probable cause is the standard, not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the
defendant quickly gives up her right to due process before a deprivation of
liberty. And often, because of the realities of modem criminal practice, this
detention hearing is the closest thing to a trial that a defendant will receive
because she will likely strike a plea bargain while in pretrial detention. Thus,
with one mini-trial, the defendant loses all opportunities to gain access to the
umbrella of constitutional protections she receives at trial, 173 including the
presumption of innocence.
With the assistance of bail reform legislation from the 1960s through the
1980s, courts have lost sight of the original purpose of bail: to assure that a
defendant appears at trial. This legislation has also opened the way for judges to
weigh defendants' guilt in determining whether to release them and focus on the
danger posed by the individual upon release, eviscerating the traditional
influence of the presumption of innocence before trial.
IV. DUE PROCESS CHANGES LIMIT PRETRIAL RIGHTS
Due to a lack of firm constitutional rooting and an increasing focus on
predicting before trial whether the defendant is guilty, the pretrial rights of
defendants have diminished. While the Supreme Court has claimed that the
presumption of innocence is constitutionally rooted, its specific roots have
rarely been discussed. Thus, the presumption of innocence has been the first and
most explicit loss for pretrial defendants, as the Supreme Court has specifically
held that pretrial defendants do not have the right to be presumed innocent and
that their detention in various contexts does not violate the Constitution. 174 And
the focus of the presumption of innocence has become an emphasis on trial
rights like proving defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 175 In addition,
172 See generally id. And the fact that the court rejected the defendant's argument that
his mother would act as his "surety" to vouch for him not committing any additional crimes
demonstrates how far we have come from historic expectations of sureties, which was
simply that they would bring the defendant to court. Id. at 1295.
173 In addition to the presumption of innocence, these include the right to confront
witnesses against him, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to a jury trial.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (discussing the constitutional protections a
criminal defendant waives when entering a guilty plea, including the "privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination," the right to trial by jury, and "the right to confront one's
accusers"); see Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 1, 18-22 (2006).
174United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) (holding that pretrial
detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not violate the Constitution); see also
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (finding that "there is nothing inherently
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct").
1751n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970).
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the Court has held that pretrial detention does not violate due process. 176 And
the focus of due process has become procedural protections that focus on
preventing defendants from being found guilty if police or prosecutors misstep,
rather than focusing on protecting individuals from deprivation of liberty before
they have been found guilty. 177
Historically, due process encompassed the fundamental rights to liberty and
a fair trial and, importantly, the idea that people are presumed innocent until
proven otherwise. 178 Over time, due process was separated from the
presumption of innocence. As society gained increased trust in police and the
state, real protections for defendants in the early stages after arrest and bail were
lost. 179 Due process came to represent freedoms for those the police had already
found guilty and society believed to be so. And due process was lost during a
fundamental time for a defendant: pretrial. These changes were particularly
apparent and troubling changes occurred, ironically, in the heyday of criminal
defendants' rights: the 1960s.180 The first part of this section discusses the
changing view of due process which led to its divorce from the presumption of
innocence and its lack of importance pretrial. The second part of this section
discusses how the lack of understanding of the shared roots of these principles
has led to inconsistencies and a lack of protection of defendants' pretrial rights.
A. Divorce of Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence
To clearly understand the historic development of due process law and the
presumption of innocence in U.S. bail law, an understanding of prevailing
views at the time when these changes occurred is appropriate. During this
fundamental time of change in criminal procedure law, Herbert Packer, in one
176 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49.
177 See Kuckes, supra note 173, at 21-22.
178 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (protecting the right to a fair
trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.");
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (protecting the right to a fair trial under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
179The initial distrust of police may have been caused by the memory of the British
Rule, see SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
63-65 (1980), but many argue that early American police were not competent and were often
driven by political forces, therefore engendering mistrust. See WILLIAM J. BoPP & DONALD
0. SCHULTZ, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 41 (1972); DAVID R.
JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY 10-11 (1981); ROBERT C. WADMAN &
WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, To PROTECT AND To SERVE: A HISTORY OF POLICE IN AMERICA
13, 16-17 (2004).
180 In the 1960s, arguably, rights before arrest increased substantially. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (limiting the ability of police to investigate with stop-and-frisks);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (limiting police electronic surveillance);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961) (regulating the admissibility of confessions
obtained by coercion).
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of the most influential pieces of criminal justice scholarship, set out two models
describing the purpose of criminal procedure. 181 These competing models were
the crime control and due process models. 182 The way scholars viewed criminal
procedure during this critical time period when the 1966 and 1984 Bail Reform
Acts and other key changes occurred is critical to understanding how we view
due process today. 183
According to Packer, there were two ways to view criminal rights. The
crime control model viewed the role of criminal procedure as reducing crime
and protecting the public. 184 It assumed that police have screened out those who
are innocent, so that those who are in the system after arrest are presumed
guilty.185 In contrast, the due process model viewed criminal procedure as
focused on protecting individual freedom. 186 This model viewed criminal
procedure as an "obstacle course" of legal protections for inmates. 187 While
Packer argued that the presumption of innocence "occupies an important
position in the Due Process Model," it treated the presumption of innocence as
an unrealistic command "to the authorities to ignore the presumption of guilt in
their treatment of the suspect," even though in most cases the suspect is
guilty. 188
Thus, Packer's due process model provides a new meaning to the
presumption of innocence-one that advantages a defendant in acquittal, rather
181 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1964) [hereinafter Packer, Two Models]; see PACKER, supra note 5, at 153. In addition, the
due process model stressed the fact that mistakes can be made in the fact-collection process
and all doubts must be resolved before conviction. Packer, Two Models, supra, at 14; see
also Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671,
672 (1999) (noting that "[f]or thirty-five years now, the major models have been Packer's
due process and crime control models").
182 Packer, Two Models, supra note 181, at 6.
183 Of course, since Packer's contribution, many have criticized the two models. See
ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 39 (3d ed. 2005)
(neglecting any discussion of victims' rights); A.E. BoTrOMs & J.D. MCCLEAN,
DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 226-39 (1976) (neglecting the role of resource
management); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 576 (1973) (arguing
that the models are not actually models but "two clashing inner tendencies: the tendency
toward efficiency and the tendency toward protecting the rights of the defendant"); Doreen J.
McBamet, False Dichotomies in Criminal Justice Research, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SELECTED
READINGS 23, 31 (John Baldwin & A. Keith Bottomley eds., 1978) (arguing that there is not
much of a difference between due process and crime control in practice).
184 Packer, Two Models, supra note 181, at 9-10.
185Id. at 11.
1861d. at 16.
1871d. at 13.
1881d. at 12. These values are largely protected with a focus on "legal guilt" so that a
person is held guilty "if and only if these factual determinations are made in procedurally
regular fashion." Id. at 16. This reliance on procedures that have nothing to do with actual
guilt reflects the expansions of criminal defendants' rights during the 1960s.
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than protects her liberty. The due process model will allow those who would be
found guilty to be released based on "technicalities" in evidence collection. All
of the major "due process" rights defendants gained during the 1960s-
including reduced police rights to search and seize, Miranda protections, and
most importantly, the expansion of the exclusionary rule that allowed
suppression of evidence improperly gathered even if it proved a defendant
guilty-demonstrate the importance of technical advantages. 189 During this
time, due process was viewed as protecting against technicalities and providing
advantages to the guilty, rather than protecting liberty and a premature
determination of guilt.
Generally speaking, the two models of criminal procedure demonstrate the
modem views of the presumption of innocence and due process. 190 The
presumption of innocence applies at trial with the other "due process"
protections that allow defendants to get off on technicalities, because the
perception is that the defendant is probably guilty anyway. Due process no
longer protects a defendant's autonomy in a meaningful way because even
under the "defendant's rights" model, the defendant is assumed guilty and all
efforts are to prevent the prosecutor from being able to prove her legally so.
Neither model emphasizes meaningful pretrial rights, like allowing a defendant
to speak during a grand jury before she is indicted, allowing an adversarial
probable cause hearing in determining arrest, allowing the defendant bail before
trial to prepare her defense, a full right to all exculpatory evidence that the
prosecutor possesses, and most importantly, for this Article, delaying a
determination of a defendant's guilt until trial. 191 Neither model is focused on
189 During the 1960s, defendants' rights expanded in many key ways. The Fifth
Amendment was interpreted to encompass an active warning to all individuals in custody
and under interrogation by the police of their right to silence and to an attorney. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). All evidence that police gathered through search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment would now be excluded in state and federal
trials of defendants. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). And police needed warrants
more regularly to enter people's homes, cars, and places of business. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (homes); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211-12 (1960)
(citing Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927)) (cars).
190 Several scholars have adapted the two models or added to them to apply modem
changes. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 209-28 (1983); William J. Genego,
The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 848-56 (1988).
191 For an example of further limitations of pretrial rights, compare Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due process prevents prosecutors from suppressing
evidence both favorable and material to defendants' guilt or punishment), with Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 286 (1999) (limiting the right of defendants to receive exculpatory
evidence where they do not demonstrate prejudice), and United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
633 (2002) (limiting exculpatory evidence required to release for plea agreements).
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important pretrial rights that protect a defendant's liberty or waiting until trial to
determine a defendant's guilt.192
From the 1960s on, the determination of guilt by a judge pretrial, before the
chance for a fair trial, was not generally found to violate due process. The
courts that even noticed the conflict usually dealt with this issue by stating that
the presumption of innocence applied only at trial, and not before.' 93 This and
other confusion about how to apply due process and the presumption of
innocence has led to inconsistent results pretrial.
B. Improper Understanding of Due Process Allows for Violations
Historically, the Due Process Clause prohibited restraints on a person's
liberty without a proper determination of guilt. Early on, this determination of
guilt meant a jury trial. Additionally, due process required that an arrest and
indictment were not advertised and a person's name was not sullied until a
proper determination was made against her. Bail rights in the United States
were generally protected historically, but as discussed in the previous section,
there was a shift from the 1960s onward where due process meant something
entirely different. The Due Process Clause came to encompass judicial process
advantages given to an accused person who was deemed guilty after being
arrested. While the Due Process Clause clearly applies pretrial, 194 it no longer
protects against an improper invasion of personal liberty of a person detained
before trial. 195 Instead, the Fourth Amendment often takes the place of the Due
Process Clause. 196
19 2 At least one scholar has disagreed that the presumption of innocence should be
viewed as a strictly legal doctrine, and argued that jurors should evaluate whether a
defendant is factually guilty rather than guilty under the law. Laufer, supra note 10, at 329.
193 Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579, 584 (D.C. 1974) ("The presumption of
innocence, however, has never been applied to situations other than the trial itself. To apply
it to the pretrial bond situation would make any detention for inability to meet conditions of
release unconstitutional.").
194City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Tyler v. United
States, 705 A.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C. 1997) (applying the Due Process Clause pretrial).
195 Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 376-77 (1st Cir. 1978).
196 For instance, in a recent example of deprivation of pretrial defendants' rights, courts
have allowed searches and evidence to be collected from pretrial defendants where
previously prohibited. These decisions have expanded the principles in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 520-21 (1979), allowing further restrictions on defendants' rights after arrest and
before determination of guilt at trial. After Bell, ten federal courts of appeals held that the
Fourth Amendment did not allow an arrestee charged with a minor offense to be strip-
searched in the absence of reasonable suspicion that he is concealing a weapon or other
contraband. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296,
299 (3d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). It is important to note that the
courts did not rely on the presumption of innocence or due process to examine pretrial
restraints after Bell. Courts focused on the more robust protections of the Fourth
Amendment. However, in the last few years three en banc panels of courts of appeals,
including the Eleventh Circuit, see Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1314 (1 1th Cir. 2008),
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In an instance demonstrating the pretrial replacement of the Due Process
Clause with the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit recently held that
amendments to the Bail Reform Act that call for warrantless extraction of DNA
samples from people accused of felonies do not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 197 The defendant did not rely on due process or the presumption
of innocence successfully, but rather the Fourth Amendment prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures.198 The court held that where the sample is
collected after the judge has found probable cause to support the charges against
the defendant, the government's interest in determining the defendant's identity
outweighs her privacy interest.' 99 Without a textual basis for the presumption of
innocence, courts are left without guidance in determining when restrictions of
pretrial defendants' rights are proper and when they go too far. Pretrial
defendants' rights cannot be rooted in the Fourth Amendment alone, as
historically, the Due Process Clause has provided independent pretrial
protections to liberty and the right to a trial before a determination of guilt. And
most importantly, with guiding principles, the Due Process Clause can be
applied more consistently. Part V introduces three principles that can be
consistently applied to guard rights under the Due Process Clause and the
presumption of innocence.
Before discussing the principles that can enhance and provide consistency
to pretrial defendants' rights, the next section provides examples of how,
without guiding principles pretrial, defendants' rights cannot be applied
consistently. Indeed, there are three justifications modem courts generally rely
on for denying bail: (1) determining guilt by weighing evidence pretrial; (2)
interference with the criminal process or witness tampering; and (3) predicting
whether the defendant will be a danger to the community. The next section
discusses all of these justifications to see how courts have applied them
inconsistently to obtain different results due to a disconnect between the
presumption of innocence and the Due Process Clause.
the Ninth Circuit, see Bull v. San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2010), and the
Third Circuit, see Florence, 621 F.3d at 299, 308, reversed these earlier Fourth Amendment
decisions. See also id. (holding that strip search policies forcing arrestees to submit to visual
observation of naked bodies before taking supervised shower when arrested for non-
indictable offenses is permitted). These courts reasoned that Bell did not distinguish between
the reasons a person is detained, but what is really important is that the individuals are
detained in a correctional facility, and thus lose rights. After these recent decisions,
defendants charged with minor offenses can now be strip-searched without a violation of the
Fourth Amendment or due process.
197 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010).
198 d. at 1216. This constitutes a reversal of a 2009 Ninth Circuit decision that
warrantless extraction of DNA from a pretrial detainee suspected of a crime other than the
one for which he was being held very clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. Friedman v.
Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 2009).
199 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1228.
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1. Weighing of Evidence Pretrial
Many states allow weighing of the evidence before trial in capital cases,
though this rationale has also expanded to noncapital cases. In many states, bail
and pretrial detention practice has followed a pattern similar to the federal
evolution of bail law. Like the federal government, many states allowed a bail
exception for capital cases where there was significant evidence.200 While flight
risk was considered in determining whether most defendants should be released
on bail for lesser crimes, for murder, in many states, courts considered other
factors because there was a larger risk that the defendant may flee.20 1
Early cases indicate that American courts looked at the weight of evidence
against a defendant, but only for capital cases. In fact, some courts went as far
as stating that an indictment for a capital offense carried a heavy presumption of
guilt until trial. 202 This rationale was also accepted by the Supreme Court until
1951.203 Up until that time, pretrial detention for the purpose of protecting
society from a potentially dangerous defendant was not valid in American
courts.
204
200 One court expanded this concept noting the permissibility of detaining a defendant
without bail if he has "dangerously wound[ed] another," on the theory that the alleged victim
might die and the defendant would be charged with capital murder. Commonwealth v. Trask,
15 Mass. (1 Tyng) 277, 277 (1818); see also Exparte Andrews, 19 Ala. 582, 586 (1851)
(allowing detention "in the event that a capital felony will shortly be consummated"). Note
as well that during this time capital offenses included most felonies. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 333-42 (1972) (discussing the historic development of capital punishment in
the United States).
201 The rationale was that in murder cases a defendant has a greater incentive to flee, so
courts can consider additional factors in determining whether the defendant will flee. The
rationale for granting courts limited discretion in the case of capital offenses was that the
accused posed a much greater flight risk when there was substantial evidence against him. In
short, an accused facing death would rather forfeit his property by failing to appear at trial if
it meant preserving his life. See, e.g., State v. Zarinsky, 380 A.2d 685, 687 (N.J. 1977) ("The
underlying motive for denying bail in capital cases was to secure the accused's presence at
the trial. In a choice between hazarding his life before a jury and forfeiting his or his
sureties' property, the framers of the many State Constitutions felt that an accused would
probably prefer the latter. But when life was not at stake and consequently the strong flight-
urge was not present, the framers obviously regarded the right to bail as imperatively
present."); Exparte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (Sutherland, J., concurring)
("If capital, bail should not in general be allowed, because no pecuniary consideration can
weigh against life; and where guilt is clear, and a rigorous and disgraceful imprisonment
may follow for a great length of time, the presumption is strong that the accused will not
appear.").2 02 See, e.g., Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1156 n.12 (8th Cir. 1981) (nonbailable
offenses include homicide).
203 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("[F]ederal law has unequivocally provided
that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail.").
2 04 See Note, supra note 68, at 1489 ("In theory, the sole danger at which bail is aimed is
the possibility of flight; present law does not authorize detention of offenders on the ground
that they may, if released on bail, commit further crimes or interfere with witnesses and
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However, states have diverged greatly over time on what factors are
permissible to consider when making decisions on release. Consistent with
federal law, most states initially categorized noncapital offenses as bailable and
capital offenses as nonbailable. And courts held that bail before conviction is a
matter of right, not discretion, for all offenses but capital offenses.205 Many
state constitutions also included provisions allowing detention for capital cases
where there was enough "proof' against the defendant. 206 States have differed
on how to apply this requirement of "proof," with some placing the burden on
the government 20 7 and others placing the burden on the defendant to rebut the
presumption. 208
In a few early cases, judges determined a defendant's guilt in deciding to
release her under this capital murder exception. However, in examining the
"proof" against the defendant, a few courts have been careful to acknowledge
evidence."); see also United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (1969) (per curiam) ("The
structure of the [1966 Bail Reform] Act and its legislative history make it clear that in
noncapital cases pretrial detention cannot be premised upon an assessment of danger to the
public should the accused be released.").
205 Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1, 6 (1870) (capital offenses "where the 'proof is evident, or
presumption great' are not guaranteed release on bail (quoting Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss.
673, 673 (1856))).
206 ARZ. CONST. art. II, § 22 (capital offense not bailable where proof is evident or
presumption great); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (same); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19 (same); FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 14 (same).
207 Some states required that the burden of showing that the proof was great be placed
on the government. Texas initially found that the burden should be on the accused in capital
cases. Ex parte Smith, 5 S.W. 99, 100 (Tex. Ct. App. 1887). Later, Texas decided that the
burden should instead be on the government in capital cases to prove that "proof is eviden[t]
that the prisoner is guilty." By contrast, the prisoner is entitled to bail in noncapital crimes.
Exparte Newman, 41 S.W. 628, 629 (Tex. Ct. App. 1897). In a much later New Jersey case,
a court held similarly that other than in cases where the defendant is accused of a capital
crime and the proof is evident and the presumption great, the burden of proof should be on
the government, as this "conforms with the pervasive presumption of innocence attending all
criminal charges." State v. Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 744 (N.J. 1960). The court further
explained that since the rule is generally that the accused should have a right to bail, then
"[t]he burden should rest on the party relying on the exception." Id.; see also People v.
Purcell, 758 N.E.2d 895, 898 (I11. App. Ct. 2001) (putting the burden of proof on the accused
for pretrial release violates the presumption of innocence).
208 For example, in Iowa, a court held broadly that the burden of proof should be on the
government. Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 255 (1916). While in Oklahoma, a court noted
that the "settled rule" in Oklahoma is that for capital offenses the burden of proof is on the
defendant to show he is entitled to bail, and if he cannot allege sufficient facts to create a
reasonable doubt of his guilt, he will not be admitted to bail. Ex parte Burton, 21 Okla.
Crim. 92, 94-95 (Crim. App. 1922) (holding where the defendant refused to testify that he
could not be admitted to bail because he did not prove guilt was not evident); see also Ex
parte Dodds, 21 Okla. Crim. 54, 54 (Crim. App. 1922) (holding a defendant charged with
murder was entitled to bail where there was a direct conflict between defense and state
evidence); Ex parte Lacy, 20 Okla. Crim. 440, 442 (Crim. App. 1922) (noting that "[t]he
filing of an information... is prima facie evidence that the proof of guilt is evident and the
presumption thereof great").
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the Due Process Clause and made sure it was not determining guilt or
innocence. 20 9 But other courts have come dangerously close to violating due
process and the presumption of innocence in determining guilt of capital
defendants before trial. For instance, a New York case applying the state capital
crime exception stated that if the evidence indicated that there is no reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the defendant, he should not receive bail.210 The invocation
of the "reasonable doubt" standard before trial and without a jury contradicts
historical notions that a determination of guilt only comes after a jury trial. 211
What is more, the weighing of evidence and determination of guilt before
trial expanded to a few courts in noncapital cases. The courts there actually held
that if the judge determines that a defendant is guilty, without a large doubt, the
defendant should not be released on bail. 212 These courts failed to discuss
potential due process or presumption of innocence concerns with weighing the
evidence against the defendant before trial.
2. Interference with Criminal Process
Some courts refuse to deny bail for defendants even where they have
threatened witnesses, 213 denying it only it if the defendant is considered
"dangerous." 214 These two factors are wholly different and should be analyzed
20 9 For there to be enough proof, the court required that evidence must be "cogent and
persuasive" and that a "'fair likelihood' of conviction" must be demonstrated. State v. Engel,
99 N.J. 453, 459-60 (1985) (quoting State v. Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 745 (N.J. 1960)).
The Vermont Constitution also allowed "the denial of bail for offenses punishable by life
imprisonment where the evidence of guilt [was] great." State v. Passino, 577 A.2d 281, 284
(Vt. 1990); see VT. CONST. ch. II, § 40 (1995); State v. Duff, 563 A.2d 258, 261 (Vt. 1989).
In interpreting this provision, a Vermont court noted that "It]his exception to the right to bail
responds to concerns about the risk of flight and the dangerousness of persons charged with
very serious offenses." Passino, 577 A.2d at 284-85.
2 1 0Exparte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39, 51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825). Similar to New York, the New
Jersey Constitution provides that all persons are entitled to bail, except for those with capital
offenses, when "the proof is evident or presumption [is] great." N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 11.
2 11Exparte Tayloe, 5 Cow. at 51.
212In an 1848 New York case where the defendant had already been convicted of a
misdemeanor for performing an abortion, the court said, "[o]n a question of bail before
indictment, the magistrate may inquire as to the guilt of the prisoner." People v. Lohman, 2
Barb. 450, 454 (N.Y. App. Div. 1848).
213 See, e.g., United States v. Bigelow, 544 F.2d 904, 907-08 (6th Cir. 1976); Mastrian
v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 712 (8th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) ("[A] state court may in a
particular situation make denial or postponement of the general right to bail where this
rationally appears to be necessary to prevent a threat or likelihood of interference with the
processes of investigation or the orderliness of trial[.]"); Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013,
1019-20 (W.D. Va. 1972) (denying bail based partially on a death threat to a witness);
Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 581-82 (D.C. 1989) (requiring the standard of clear
and convincing evidence that defendant threatened a prospective witness).
214 Jones v. United States, 347 A.2d 399, 400-01 (D.C. 1975).
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separately.215 As to the first factor, there is little evidence historically that bail
was intended to deter pretrial crime. Denying bail due to predicted
dangerousness may have violated historic rights to due process and the
presumption of innocence, but it has the blessing of the Supreme Court.
However, interference with the criminal process is a different matter. Though
this has not been as explicit a cause for denying bail, it is not an affront to due
process to deny bail in order to protect the criminal process. 216 When an
accused has threatened witnesses, the judge should consider this in denying bail.
The presumption of innocence requires no improper inferences before a
determination of guilt, but under its proper meaning, it should not tolerate
interference with judicial processes. Due to the constitutional connection of the
presumption with the Due Process Clause, the presumption's purpose is to
preserve innocence until a fair trial.217 A proper trial can fairly decide guilt, and
the presumption should not act as a barrier that provides a defendant with an
opportunity to destroy evidence before trial. Allowing a defendant to threaten
witnesses or interfere with the criminal process unfairly advantages a defendant
and does not protect the presumption of innocence. It would be an improper
understanding of due process to allow a defendant to threaten witnesses while
on release and prohibit a judge from considering such interference in denying
release. This confusion, as well as the confusion illustrated in the determination
of pretrial dangerousness below, shows why a principled understanding of what
due process should and should not permit is necessary.
3. Predicting Danger to the Community
Recent courts examining due process and bail rights have allowed judges to
determine whether a defendant poses a danger to the community. The
examination of whether a defendant poses a danger in deciding bail violates
original notions of the presumption of innocence. In 1982, the Hawaii Supreme
Court outright struck down a "proof is great" statute. The court held that a
statute that denied bail when the offense is serious, the proof is evident and
215 State v. Pray, 346 A.2d 227, 229-30 (Vt. 1975); In re Underwood, 508 P.2d 721, 724
(Cal. 1973).2 16 There is a legitimate argument that the value of the common law pretrial examination
of witnesses was a critical component of the due process right, starting at least in the 16th
Century. See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (Eng.); 1
STEPHEN, supra note 24, at 326 (discussing demands by defendants to have the "accusers"
brought against him). In some cases, these demands were refused, see Raleigh's Case, 2
How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16, 24 (1603), but the witnesses' testimony was obviously deemed
critical for trial as the pretrial examination of witnesses did not satisfy the demands of due
process. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 21-34 (1974).
217 State v. Parker, 757 N.W.2d 7, 14 (Neb. 2008) (noting that "[o]ne of the essential
safeguards of a fair trial is the benefit of the presumption of innocence" and due process);
State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 876-77 (Iowa 2003) (holding that due process is violated
when it is not complied with throughout trial and "guilt or innocence" is not "determined
solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial").
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
presumption great, was unconstitutional. 218 Prior to 1980, the Hawaii statute
recited simply, like many other statutes, that "all persons charged with criminal
offenses shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for offenses punishable
by imprisonment for life not subject to parole, when the proof is evident or the
presumption great."219 "The statute was augmented in 1980 to limit the
availability of bail" 220 when the offense was a serious crime or felony and there
was "a clear danger to society. '221 The court struck down the 1980 provision
because it violated the Due Process Clause by presuming dangerousness "from
the fact that [the defendant] had been charged with a serious crime" and for not
leaving the judge enough discretion to consider releasing the defendant based
on the likelihood that the defendant would commit crimes pending trial. 222 In
other words, the court disapproved of the statute for determining that
individuals would not receive bail due to "presumed dangerousness" without
consideration of other factors, rather than because it allowed judicial weighing
of evidence pretrial. 223
This Hawaii decision demonstrates the change in judicial attitude about
pretrial judicial predictions. In the 1950s and 1960s, courts challenged the
foreign concept of allowing judges to predict whether an individual is likely to
commit additional crimes. However, this Hawaii court, in 1982, did not find
fault with a judge determining the likelihood of the accused committing
additional crimes while on release. The court here just wanted the defendants to
have an ability to rebut the presumption that they are dangerous, and relies more
on this procedural protection than a more fundamental due process concern that
the judge not be permitted to presume a defendant's future guilt. This Hawaii
case is an excellent example of the changes in interpretation of the Due Process
Clause when it comes to bail and the greater focus on procedural obstacles that
prevent a defendant from being found guilty rather than actually requiring a trial
before making presumptions of guilt.224
In 2010, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a similar statute
holding that due process is not violated when the court considers flight risk or
2 18 Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527, 540 (1982).
219Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
2201d.
221 Id.
2221d. at 543.
223 Id,
224 Before this decision and the Bail Reform Act, when there was more of a controversy
about judges considering factors other than flight risk in determining whether to release on
bail, other statutes like the Hawaii one were challenged and upheld, allowing courts to weigh
the evidence of the alleged crime before allowing release on bail. In many courts, however,
defendants are still detained based on the gravity of the offense and weight of the evidence,
particularly for previous capital crimes, like murder. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
628, 657 n.45 (1972). But see Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 296 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa. 1972)
(releasing defendant accused of murder on bail because the Constitution mandated bail in
noncapital cases and Pennsylvania had abolished the death penalty).
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dangerousness. 225 The court argued that "from the beginning of the bail system,
an exception to the rule favoring bail was made for persons accused of serious
crimes that focused the inquiry solely on the evidence of the defendant's
guilt. '226 Nonetheless, the court said that the concepts of dangerousness and
flight risk are implicit in the statutory reference to "proof is evident,", so those
factors will not be completely ignored.227 The court further held that before
denying bail the burden of "reasonable doubt" is not used and that the "clear
and convincing evidence" burden is sufficient. 228 The court said that requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for detention, in essence, puts the cart before
the horse and makes the state prove before trial what it will have to prove at
trial. 22
9
The arguments in this recent New Hampshire case show the tensions
inherent in today's pretrial detention decision. On the one hand, we allow
judges to consider a defendant's guilt and weigh the evidence to determine
whether she will go to prison or be released, but on the other hand we do not
require the due process protections that usually accompany this decision,
including a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, pretrial we
are satisfied with evidence of a defendants' guilt of probable cause and clear
and convincing evidence. On top of that, considering that most defendants plead
guilty and that being detained during the plea bargain puts them at a
disadvantage, 230 this lower burden and ability of a judge to determine such facts
seem even more significant. While historically in capital cases courts were
allowed to weigh evidence, it was only allowed as a factor to determine flight
risk, not to detain a defendant if she was likely to be found guilty. And
predictions of future dangerousness were banned due to the presumption of
innocence and due process. These cases demonstrate how uncontroversial future
predictions and considering dangerousness have become. Using the three
principles discussed in Part V, it becomes clear that only two of these
justifications should allow denial of bail: interference with criminal processes,
and in some instances, danger to the community.
225 State v. Furgal, 13 A.3d 272, 279 (N.H. 2010).
2261d
"
227 The New Hampshire Supreme Court conflates the judge's weighing of "proof' and
considering dangerousness, stating that these factors have always gone together. Id.228 1d. at 280-81.
229Id. at 280 (rejecting the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because that
is the degree of proof reserved for trial, not bail).
2 3 0 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
933 (2007); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 2463, 2492-93 (2004) (recognizing that pretrial detention leads to "quick plea bargains
in small cases, even if the defendant would probably win acquittal at an eventual trial").
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V. PRINCIPLES OF PRETRIAL DUE PROCESS
Courts and scholars disagree as to how or if the presumption of innocence
should apply pretrial. Some courts have continued to use the presumption
pretrial, and others have refused to apply it.231 Other courts have forgotten that
the presumption historically protected bail rights in most cases and focus
heavily on community safety in determining bail.232 Some scholars believe it
should prohibit punishment and others say it should prohibit treating the
accused like a convicted person.233 As far as investigation of the accused,
scholars have noted that the presumption should not prohibit the State from
taking steps that assume guilt and that are necessary to investigate the
circumstances of the incident and conduct the trial.234 In these discussions,
often scholars point to normative reasons why the state should preserve the
presumption of innocence. 235 Normative reasons for protecting the presumption
of innocence exist, but are not the most concrete way to protect a right that is
often easy to neglect when prosecutors and courts are faced with concerns about
public safety.236 Other scholars have noted that the key in stopping the violation
231 Compare People v. Purcell, 758 N.E.2d 895, 902 (I11. App. Ct. 2001) (refusing to
apply Bell because it "was not concerned with bail proceedings" and instead choosing to
apply Stack to hold that the presumption of innocence does "attach to bail proceedings"),
with Exparte Elliott, 950 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (per curiam) (stating that
"the presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal
trials and does not apply to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee").
232 See, e.g., United States v. Kisling, 334 F.3d 734, 735 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that
"counter-intuitively" the burden is higher for the government to prove risk of harm than risk
of flight in determining bail and failing to recognize the historical presumption in favor of
bail).
2 33 Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REv. 257, 287 (2002); Miller &
Guggenheim, supra note 142, at 342 (considering "the need for a constitutional conception
of punishment to replace the Supreme Court's assertion that detention on the basis of
predicted criminality is not punishment").2 34 Kitai, supra note 233, at 292.
2351d. at 295 (noting that judges should "refrain from passing judgement... for
preventing the moral harm resulting from the breach of this commitment"); Ndiva Kofele-
Kale, Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and Interests in Combating Economic
Crimes, 40 INT'L LAW. 909, 923-24 (2006); John M. Tyson, Presumed Guilty Until Proven
Innocent: Using Results of Statistical or Econometric Studies as Evidence, 10 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 387, 390-92 (1998); Alexander G.P. Goldenberg, Note, Interested, but Presumed
Innocent: Rethinking Instructions on the Credibility of Testifying Defendants, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 745, 747-49 (2007).
236 Practically speaking, scholars have promoted protections that would allow pretrial
detainees to have the presumption of innocence while detained pretrial:
[P]retrial detainees have to be held as far away as possible from sentenced prisoners;
detainees have a right not to be compelled to work, but rather to work at
will[.] ... [D]etainees have a right to wear their own clothes.... [and] [d]etainees
should have a right to almost unlimited contact with the outside world through visits
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of the presumption of innocence (and allowing preventative detention) is
defining punishment appropriately. 237 Without a clear understanding of the
purpose of the presumption of innocence, it cannot be applied properly pretrial.
Clearer guidelines, preferably rooted in constitutional text, may be more
effective in defining the purpose of the presumption of innocence where a
slippery slope may lead to reduced rights. Scholars in recent years have not
articulated principles that will help protect the rights of defendants pretrial,
while allowing a fair trial that society and crime victims deserve. And thus, the
focus of the presumption of innocence has become an emphasis on trial rights
like proving defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus of due
process has also shifted to encompass procedural protections that block a
defendant from being found guilty if the police or prosecutors did not act
carefully, rather than protecting individuals from any deprivations of liberty
until a proper determination of guilt at trial. In recent years, due process has
been more heavily focused on procedures that help a defendant avoid
punishment, like the exclusionary rule, rights to Miranda, and rights to
confrontation. While these rights are critical in increasing police
professionalism, there has been a missing emphasis on legal innocence and
pretrial liberty-which historically represented the pinnacle of pretrial due
process. As such, we now allow judges to predict factually whether someone is
guilty without any procedural or legal protections that accompany a defendant
at trial, as these are considered "technicalities." This is significant since over
90% of defendants never go to trial and thus never receive the protection of due
process or the presumption of innocence. 238
Because there has been no focus on the constitutional basis for the
presumption of innocence, there have been inconsistent distinctions made
regarding when detention is and is not appropriate pretrial. However, when the
presumption of innocence is tied to due process protections that prohibit a
deprivation of liberty until a determination of guilt, there is a constitutional
basis that allows for more consistent determinations of what deprivations of
liberty are and are not allowed. Obviously, there must be some deprivation of
liberty allowed pretrial-and in turn some infringements on a defendant's
presumed innocence. Without any deprivation of liberty, arrest would never be
allowed until trial. Some deprivation of liberty is allowed, but the question
and telephones.... Rights should be restricted only upon an individualized suspicion
and not as a general policy of controlling discipline.
Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Conditions of Confinement-The Duty to Grant the Greatest Possible
Liberty for Pretrial Detainees, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 250, 271-72 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
237 This definition may be based on the punisher's intent, the effect of the punishment,
or the legitimacy of the grounds on which the punitive power is exercised. Miller &
Guggenheim, supra note 142, at 365; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321-22 (1869).
2 38 See PLEA-BARGAINING 77 (William F. McDonald & James A. Cramer eds., 1980)
(observing that the role of the judiciary has changed dramatically over time since up to 90%
of convictions result from guilty pleas in the negotiation process).
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remains for how long and for what reasons it is justified. Whether we are
justified in detaining an individual because he will flee before trial or because
he may commit an additional crime are both reasonable and rational purposes
for detaining a defendant pretrial as far as society is concerned, but which of
them is in accord with a defendant's due process rights? Which purpose is
consistent with the modem reality that many defendants are recidivists? And
which comports with society's increased expectation of protection from crime?
The following three principles, derived from earlier historical analysis, help
answer these questions.
A. Pretrial Restraints ofLiberty
First, defendants should maintain pretrial liberty before trial unless there is
a proper basis.239 The proper basis for restricting a person's liberty includes
ensuring a person's attendance at trial, safeguarding the judicial process from
interference by a defendant, and protecting the security of the facility if a
defendant is detained (which should be a rare occurrence)-while interfering as
little as possible with a defendant's trial preparation. As the historical analysis
demonstrates, the presumption of innocence deems a defendant innocent until
the judicial process has been concluded and it has been found otherwise.240
Thus, a defendant can be held in detention in extreme cases where the
government has proven that there is a substantial risk of a defendant threatening
or stopping witnesses from testifying at trial.241 And a defendant can be held
because there is a substantial risk, due to the defendant's out-of-state or country
connections, that she will flee the jurisdiction before her guilt is determined at
trial. Though, arguably, the problem of flight risk is a much smaller issue in
today's world of ankle bracelets, passport freezes, and other GPS tracking
devices.
Under this principle, an arrest would be justified upon probable cause
because the arrest signifies a temporary removal of an individual from society
for the purpose of determining whether she is guilty or innocent of the crime
with which she has been charged. If the presumption of innocence was taken
more seriously upon arrest, the government would take more precautions to
239 For a recent example of an application of the presumption of innocence to bail, see
United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting bail and
stating that the risk of economic danger to the community was not enough to overturn the
presumption of release pretrial).
240 Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) ("The statutes of the United States have
been framed upon the theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been
finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo
imprisonment or punishment .... ); Zydok v. Butterfield, 187 F.2d 802, 804 (6th Cir. 1951)
(stating that bail shall not be denied as punishment).
241 This later point is like the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine under the law of
evidence since defendants lose the rights to bail if they interfere with witnesses who plan to
testify against them. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008).
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ensure that a person's reputation is not tarnished by the arrest and to make clear
that the defendant is not presumed guilty until found so by a court of law. For
instance, a defendant would not be arrested in public and announcements of the
arrest would not be made public until trial.242 To counterbalance the public
nature of an arrest, however, a defendant's arrest and the Gerstein hearing that
follows should come with adversarial protections that would be provided at
trial. A defendant should have the requisite due process protections before being
deprived of liberty more permanently. The arrest is a critical part of the pretrial
process, as now a trial is unlikely and there are fewer stages that a defendant
undergoes before pleading guilty.
A defendant's liberty should be less severely affected while detained
pretrial, so that the presumption of innocence is protected as much as possible.
If all three of these principles are respected, instances of detention will be
rare,243 and when a defendant is detained for proper reasons, limits can be
placed upon her while in detention. While currently the Due Process Clause
protects pretrial detainees from "punishment," the real focus should be best
allowing them to prepare for trial-with minimal limits placed on defendants'
liberty to secure the detention facility. For instance, some limits on the items
defendants can receive through the mail, invasive searches of people entering or
of residents after contact with individuals outside, or sharing a room with
another detainee are not necessarily violations of the presumption of
innocence. 244 The Supreme Court, in upholding the foregoing conditions,
242 Here, however, the presumption of innocence conflicts with the First Amendment
rights of reporters and victims, allowing society to hear the defendant's story before it is
presented more fairly in the adversarial setting of trial.
243 Another reason why detention should be rare is that private losses for defendants are
great when being held pretrial. The injuries to those detained include: the social stigma of
incarceration, see GARY T. TROTTER, THE LAW OF BAIL IN CANADA 37 (2d ed. 1999);
Michael J. Eason, Eighth Amendment-Pretrial Detention: What Will Become of the
Innocent?, 78 J. Cri. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1048, 1065 (1988); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Preventive
Detention, A Species of LydfordLaw, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 122-23 (1983); David J.
Rabinowitz, Preventive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent, 32
AM. U. L. REV. 191, 211-12 (1982); Robert S. Natalini, Comment, Preventive Detention and
Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 246
(1985), the physical and emotional injuries that may come from detention, alienation from
family and society, see Allen D. Applbaum, Note, As Time Goes By: Pretrial Incarceration
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
1055, 1082 (1987), and the loss of work options, loss of future employment, and exposure to
convicted criminals, see MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DETENTION BEFORE TRIAL 104-05 (1965).
Another injury is that the lack of public defenders and denial of bail together may deny those
detained their due process rights. See Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect
Suggests that Judges Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011).
244 Courts have guaranteed pretrial detainees reasonable medical care, see State ex rel.
Riley v. Rudloff, 575 S.E.2d 377, 387-88 (W. Va. 2002), recreation, see Wickham v. Fisher,
629 P.2d 896, 901 (Utah 1981), and critical rights like the right to documents necessary for
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unnecessarily cast a shadow on the significance of the presumption of
innocence pretrial. The Court could have indicated that some limits are
permitted pretrial and others are not depending on whether they restrict a
defendant's ability to prepare for trial or restrain her liberty without a proper
basis.245 Given that the crux of the presumption of innocence is due process and
preserving a defendant's ability to prepare for a trial that determines her guilt,
none of the Bell conditions would have violated the defendant's rights to the
presumption of innocence. Restrictions that may violate the presumption of
innocence for pretrial detainees would be limits on the types and number of
visitors they could receive at a facility, restrictions in sharing documents that
may relate to witness preparation, and special prohibitions on making calls,
receiving confidential mail, and using library or computer facilities that would
help them prepare for trial.246
B. Pretrial Weighing of Evidence and Predicting Crime
Second, judges should not be able to weigh evidence against defendants to
determine whether they are guilty before trial. Though judges, in rare
circumstances, may be permitted to consider the potential for future crimes on
pretrial release when a defendant is a recidivist and has a serious record of prior
convictions. Historically, judges were not permitted to look at the facts and
circumstances of the crime a defendant allegedly committed in order to
determine whether to release him on bail. Bail was a presumed right for most
defendants, as it allowed defendants to prepare for trial and because they were
presumed innocent at this point and could not be deprived of their liberty
without the due process protections. The only exception to this rule was in
communication with individuals regarding litigation, see Tyler v. Whitehead, 583 S.W.2d
240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam).
245 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) ("This traditional right to freedom before
conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the
infliction of punishment prior to conviction."); see also Hampton v. State, 42 Ohio St. 401,
404 (1884) ("The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the one arrested when his
personal presence is needed; and, consistently with this, to allow to the accused proper
freedom and opportunity to prepare his defense. The punishment should be after the
sentence."). Indeed, in line with the 1966 Act, another reason defendants are presumptively
released pretrial is to avoid negative financial consequences to themselves and their families.
See United States v. Barber, 140 U.S. 164, 167 (1891) (For "the interest of the public as well
as the accused" the defendant should not be detained before trial "if the government can be
assured of his presence at that time" because defendants are often poor and to require them
to pay bail would mean that they would remain in jail and "their families would be deprived,
in many instances, of their assistance and support.").
246 See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (discussing "shakedown[s]"
or searches of prison cells); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 553-54 (1979) (receipt of
packages); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1976) (visitation); People v.
Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1114-15 (Cal. 2000) (access to legal materials in detention); Lawler
v. State, 453 P.2d 333, 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (access to counsel in detention).
[Vol. 72:4
RESTORING PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
capital cases under the common law, and in most of the U.S. states from early
on, judges were permitted to consider the weight of the evidence against the
defendant before determining whether to release her before trial. The
justification for this was that because the defendant was charged with a capital
crime, the incentive to flee the jurisdiction to avoid trial and potentially death
was too great. Those charged with serious crimes were never detained pretrial
based on the concern that the accused would commit further crimes or based on
weighing of evidence against them. However, this minor loophole that allowed
judges to consider other factors besides flight risk was expanded. First, in the
late 1940s, the Supreme Court allowed additional factors such as the weight of
the evidence against the defendant and nature and circumstances of the crime to
be considered in determining whether the defendant would appear for trial.
Later, in the 1960s, these factors became important for determining whether a
defendant could be released pretrial. And finally, in the 1980s, these factors, in
addition to future dangerousness of a defendant, were added to allow a judge to
fully weigh the evidence of guilt and predict whether a defendant would commit
a crime on bail.
Today, it is a widespread practice for courts to predict whether a defendant
is guilty of the crime charged. The courts can properly weigh the evidence
against the defendant in a mini-trial before the actual trial (and significantly,
without many of the protections that accompany a defendant at trial) and
determine whether the defendant should be detained. If the defendant is more
likely to have committed the crime based on the evidence presented, he is
detained. If the weight of the evidence is in the defendant's favor, he may be
released.2 47
Further, judges can detain an individual based on concerns for safety of the
community and the dangerousness of the defendant. 248 If the judge determines,
based on the defendant's criminal history, the evidence against him of this
particular crime, or other information before the court that the defendant is
likely to pose a danger to society that no bail conditions can prevent, the
defendant can be detained. And even more commonly than that, the judge can
set higher bail amounts for an individual he deems dangerous or one charged
with a more serious crime, based purely on those determinations, rather than on
the defendant's ability to flee and avoid judgment. Where historically judges
were limited to predicting whether the defendant would appear at trial, now they
247 In federal court, the burden of persuasion is clear and convincing evidence for
community safety, see United States v. Ciccone, 312 F.3d 535, 543 (2d Cir. 2002), and
preponderance of the evidence that accused is a flight risk, see United States v. Cisneros,
328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003), though clear and convincing evidence has been required
for both, see Kleinbart v. United States, 604 A.2d 861, 871 (D.C. 1992).
248 For a criticism of future dangerousness assessments, see Joseph E. Kennedy, The
Danger of Dangerousness as a Basis for Incarceration, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS
83, 83 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) ("[F]uture dangerousness is too dangerous as a
sole basis for incarceration because it appeals too directly to our deepest, strongest, and
potentially most violent instinct-self-preservation.").
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can predict substantively based on various factors whether a defendant will
commit a crime while released. In this determination, the judge is given broader
powers than he has at trial.249
While predicting whether a defendant will commit crimes while on release
squarely violates historical due process notions, it may be reasonable for courts
to make such assessments in a modem world where many defendants are
recidivists. But should judges be permitted to infer any guilt with respect to
pending indictments for defendants with previous convictions? Obviously
judges are not permitted to consider pending indictments or evidence on the
current charge under due process principles, but what about previous
convictions? Does the presumption of innocence persist when the defendant has
been convicted of a crime? The answer to this question, according to modem
case law, is clear. 25° On the one hand, the presumption of innocence is
relinquished after a trial that determines a defendant's guilt. Similarly, when a
defendant pleads guilty the presumption of innocence no longer applies. But
what should courts infer if the defendant is subsequently charged with a crime
that he has been convicted of several times in the past? The presumption of
innocence does not require courts to cast a blind eye when it comes to
determining defendants' rights and making decisions that affect the safety of the
community. But historically, judges have only been permitted to take notice of
information relating to defendants' previous convictions in determining whether
the defendant is a flight risk.251 Thus, judges should not "weigh" any of the
evidence alleged against defendants before trial, though with recidivist
defendants, judges may consider prior convictions in assessing whether they
pose a danger to the community.
C. Pretrial Focus on Legal Innocence
Third, the focus of pretrial protections for a defendant should not be on
obtaining the truth of a person's guilt or innocence, but should protect a
defendant's liberty until innocence or guilt can be proven at trial. This is what
the marriage between the Due Process Clause and the presumption of innocence
249 As such, this decision is likely to also violate the Sixth Amendment. This will be
discussed more fully in a follow-up article.250 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993) ("Once a defendant has been afforded a
fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of
innocence disappears."); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973) ("A verdict
against the defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of
guilt upon appeal.").
251 United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Just as the
Due Process Clause would prohibit incarcerating a person not even accused of a crime in
order to prevent his future crimes, it would equally bar preventive detention of a person who
has been convicted of past crimes and has served his sentence. The Clause must accord
similar protection to a person not convicted but only accused of a crime."). Also, due to the
presumption of innocence, previous arrests generally should not be considered against a
defendant nor should allegations that have not been proven in court.
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has historically required. Due process has required a focus on proving legal
guilt and without this emphasis pretrial, the presumption of innocence is left
weak. Thus, a change in focus on legal innocence in the pretrial stages would
help restore the constitutional link between the Due Process Clause and the
presumption of innocence.
However, there is currently a lack of focus on legal guilt pretrial. 252 During
all of the important pretrial stages, including arrest,253 the grand jury hearing,254
a pretrial detention hearing, a preliminary hearing, 255 and during plea
negotiations, 256 there is no focus on the defendant's right to be presumed
innocent.257 This right only attaches after the defendant has worked her way
through the system to trial, the last stage, which only about 5% of defendants
ever reach.258 Thus, the presumption of innocence-typically requiring a focus
on proving legal guilt and requiring liberty-is not able to have an impact. The
presumption of innocence is most important at the most earliest stages of
accusation, when it is not yet a foregone conclusion that the defendant is guilty,
yet it applies only at the final stage: trial.
In early England, the presumption of innocence was a factual and legal
presumption. Due to the link with due process, a person accused of a crime was
protected from punishment until facts established that she had committed the
crime. 259 In some instances, the presumption so protected the innocent that
people who falsely accused an individual were put to death or faced the
252 As discussed above, judges are permitted to weigh the evidence against a defendant
in determining whether to release her. This "weighing" of the evidence robs the jury of its
role-proscribed by the Due Process Clause-to determine legal guilt at trial.
253 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123-25 (1975) (failing to rely on the presumption of
innocence in requiring that probable cause be established before or promptly after an arrest).
254 GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE GRAND JURY 37 (1906) ("Primarily the object of the
grand jury is not to protect the innocent.., but is to accuse those persons, who, upon the
evidence submitted by the prosecutor, if uncontradicted, would cause the grand jurors to
believe the defendant guilty of the offence charged.").
2 5 5 JoHN N. FERDICO ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROFESSIONAL 805 (10th ed. 2009) (noting that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to
determine "whether a crime was committed; whether the crime occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court; and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed the crime").256 F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB.
L. 189, 232 (2002) (discussing whether plea bargaining preserves the presumption of
innocence or not).
257 Una Ni Raifeartaigh, Reconciling Bail Law with the Presumption of Innocence, 17
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (1997) (discussing the different views in the U.S. and other
common law jurisdictions on whether the presumption of innocence applies pretrial).
2 5 8 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1016 (4th ed.
2010) (citing 2004 statistics that 96.4% of federal convictions were resolved without trial
and that 95% of state felony convictions were resolved by guilty plea).
259 Quintard-Mor6nas, supra note 11, at 111 n.25 (noting that under Roman law the
burden of proof rested on the accuser).
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punishment that they alleged another person to have committed.260 But during
this time, if a person confessed in open court or the judge determined that there
was sufficient proof of guilt before trial, in some cases, the individual would
lose her right to the presumption of innocence. There was a great desire to
disincentivize individuals from falsely accusing others because of the
experience of English kings who imprisoned political enemies under false
charges.261 The early colonies inherited this mistrust of the government from
their experience with British kings, but, over time American case law
demonstrates a larger trust of the government police force and a broader
concern for public order and safety.262
Through the 1960s, the Due Process Clause was tied closely with the
emphasis on proper legal procedures that dominated the criminal justice system.
In the 1960s, scholars documented this focus on procedural advantages and
explained that most people in the criminal justice system were guilty, so the
only way to prevent their punishment was to find that a legal procedure was not
followed properly to try to prevent a defendant from being found guilty. This
focus on legal innocence, rather than factual innocence, did not apply pretrial,
however.
Pretrial, judges rely on factual guilt and are allowed to predict and infer
guilt based on unproven evidence against the defendant. Judges "weigh" the
evidence against defendants to determine whether to release them before trial.
While the focus of due process has shifted to legal innocence throughout the
criminal justice system, in the pretrial context, the focus is factual innocence.263
2 60 See HUGH CHISHOLM, 27 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 73 (1898) (explaining
that under Roman law individuals were put to death when they falsely accused others).
However, some early cases employed methods that today would violate due process in order
to determine if someone was guilty. For instance, before the thirteenth century, in some
states the burden was reversed and the accused actually had to prove innocence. It was
extremely difficult to prove innocence as a matter of fact. In ancient Rome, some people
were tortured, and if they did not confess, they were considered innocent. In other early
cases, the public relied on revelations from God to distinguish the innocent from the person
who was the murderer or robber. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 329, 331-32 (1995).
261 S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 406-08 (2d ed.
1981) (discussing the requirement that the accuser bring the evidence against the accused).262 See supra Part III; see also Mervin F. White & Ben A. Menke, On Assessing the
Mood of the Public Toward the Police: Some Conceptual Issues, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 211, 223
(1982) (noting that the proportions of citizens who reported a positive police image when
presented general questions ranged from 75% to 80%); Catherine Gallagher et al., The
Public Image of Police: Final Report to the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(2001), http://www.theiacp.org/PoliceServices/ExecutiveServices/ProfessionalAssistance/
ThePubliclmageofthePolice/tabid/198/Default.aspx#ftl (reviewing studies on public
confidence in police and concluding that "[p]olice in America enjoy relatively high levels of
satisfaction, support, confidence, and esteem from the public").
263 There is one important exception to this statement. Several scholars have argued
convincingly that with the rise of the innocence movement, the focus has shifted from
innocence to factual or actual innocence. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Protecting the Innocent
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Once that factual determination is made by the judge, the defendant's fate is
often sealed, as detention often leads to less bargaining power and a custodial
sentence.26
4
The third principle helps courts determine whether strip searches or other
violations of privacy are appropriate for defendants being detained pretrial.265
Historically these searches were not permitted, but recently three circuits have
allowed strip searches of pretrial detainees. Strip searches that occur when a
person is detained temporarily do not restrain a defendant's liberty; though they
do infringe on a defendant's privacy rights, on the whole they do not violate the
first principle. In addition, strip searches do not violate the second principle
because they do not allow judges to predict or infer guilt of the defendant based
on the crime she has allegedly committed. Strip searches, while embarrassing
and distasteful when occurring for all defendants placed in a correctional
as the Primary Value of the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413, 434 (2009)
(describing proposals to provide additional resources for defense where the likelihood of
factual innocence is high and noting that such arrangements risk supporting the public view
that "lawyers should not defend 'those people' unless they did not commit the crime);
Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1090 (2011) (arguing that
juxtaposing "actual innocence against legal innocence dilutes what innocence means").
2 64 See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, TEN-
YEAR REPORT 1961-1971, at 19 (1972) ("[T]he detainee is more apt to be convicted than if
he were free on bail."); Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 69 (1963); Stuart S. Nagel,
Policy Evaluation and Criminal Justice, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 53, 61 (1983); Anne Rankin,
The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641, 641 (1964); see also Bellamy v.
Judges & Justices, 342 N.Y.S.2d 137, 142 n.2 (App. Div. 1973) (citing a study of 857
criminal cases that showed that people who were not released on bail were far more often
convicted, and far more often given a prison term even accounting for the merits of the
cases, or any other factors).
265 This third principle also illuminates one of the recent questions courts have faced
regarding whether it is proper to take DNA samples from defendants regarding crimes
charged. The Ninth Circuit has held that taking such samples does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. This type of intrusion into
defendants' rights does not violate a defendant's due process or presumption of innocence
rights. Gathering of DNA evidence works either to exonerate or prove the guilt of a pretrial
detainee at trial. This evidence may be gathered in the pretrial period in order to promote the
gathering of evidence so that the jury can eventually determine legal innocence. DNA
evidence goes toward proving factual guilt and innocence, which is relevant at trial. In that
pursuit it actually resolves some of the problems that have historically existed with proving
factual guilt. Before DNA evidence and other sophisticated scientific methods, a defendant
was faced solely with conflicting witness accounts or other circumstantial evidence. New
methods may allow further progress towards improving factual evidence at trial and the
making of evidence-based decisions, where previously evidence was just not reliable enough
to fairly determine a defendant's guilt.
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facility, do not favor some defendants over others, deprive liberty, or allow
judges to make trial-appropriate determinations about defendants before trial.266
The Supreme Court in Bell allowed restrictions for pretrial confinement, but
arguably went too far in limiting the application of the presumption of
innocence and due process pretrial. Perhaps the Court thought that there was no
way to allow preventative detention while consistently applying the
presumption of innocence and went too far in limiting rights to avoid this
problem. Though by applying these three principles, the Court could have
upheld the presumption of innocence and still allowed some uniform pretrial
security prohibitions. Though, because Bell was limited to pretrial confinement
and Salerno did not discuss the presumption of innocence, there is still room for
courts to reclaim defendants' due process and presumption of innocence rights
pretrial with these three principles.
VI. CONCLUSION
In our modem system of U.S. criminal justice, we proclaim that all are
innocent until proven guilty at trial but we allow judges to predict which ones
are guilty long before trial. We have adopted practices allowing predictions of
guilt and weighing of evidence against defendants before trial since defendants'
rights have lacked steady constitutional rooting. Without consistent principles to
apply due process principles and the presumption of innocence before trial,
these rights have been watered down and applied inconsistently. Three
principles emanating from the presumption of innocence and Due Process
Clause may help protect pretrial rights in a consistent and disciplined manner.
First, pretrial restraints of liberty should be limited to where there is a proper
basis. The proper basis for restricting a person's liberty includes ensuring a
person's attendance at trial, protecting the judicial process from interference by
the defendant, and if the defendant is detained, protecting the security of the
facility. Second, the pretrial focus should not be on guilt-determination and
punishment as the Due Process Clause requires a conviction of guilt by a jury in
order to punish an individual. Though judges, in rare circumstances, may be
permitted to consider the potential for future crimes on pretrial release when a
defendant is a recidivist and has a serious record of prior convictions. Third, the
focus of pretrial protections for defendants should not be on obtaining the truth
of a person's guilt or innocence, but should protect defendants' liberty until
innocence or guilt can be proven at trial. Respecting these rights will honor the
original influence of the Due Process Clause on bail rights-tempered by
modem realities-and allow a disciplined change in focus in pretrial practice.
266 Compare Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d 961, 967-68 (7th Cir. 2003) (allowing pretrial
strip search with battery misdemeanor charges), with Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248,
1255 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying a pretrial strip search for a minor offense).
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